Securing assets and the concept of security proffers an interesting set of challenges for applied modellers. In many circumstances, for example in classical access control, models of security processes need to represent system state (including the system architecture) in a high degree of detail because of the extreme sensitivity of security properties to changes of state. In many other circumstances, for instance in models of the behaviour of populations of human and economic agents subject to security threats or in models of systems with human security factors, this representation may need to include details of the choices and preferences of the agents at work within the system. Now there many security situations in which both types of detail are essential, for instance securing passenger safety in an airport (and this is partly why airport security is not straightforward). Indeed, most of the situations of interest in Seconomics will be of this nature.
However, and here is one of the challenges, it is (with any known technique) almost impossible to incorporate both detailed state and an agent-based economic view of incentives and contracts in a way that allows tractable and robust prediction of future system behaviour.
One usually has a choice either to study very abstract models with tractable equilibria, or to use detailed simulations in a more heuristic manner.
The objective of this deliverable is to provide a framework that encompasses a flexible suite of models (and modelling techniques) that range from specific encapsulations of the system architecture to those that abstract away from the specific security architecture, but capture more of the agency, public good and externality issues involved in managing security.

Pending of approval from the Research Executive Agency - EC