



SECONOMICS

D4.4 - Discourses and Justification of Security and Risk



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Executive summary

The SECONOMICS consortium consists of twelve partners, including research and industry organisations from six EU countries and Turkey. The SECONOMICS project focuses on three key security topics: critical infrastructure, airport security, and also regional and urban transport. For each security topic there is a case study designed to identify important security management issues. The scientific research of SECONOMICS combines models of game theory, systems modelling, adversarial risk analysis, and social policy in a unified framework. This framework provides insight for policy makers hoping to craft effective security policy, make useful investments in security infrastructure, understand public perceptions of security, and also understand the incentive structure of individuals and organizations in regards to security.

The interaction between security technology and public attitudes in part determines the effectiveness of different policy approaches and regimes. Risk-based models offer a means of adapting to new threats, but it is considerably difficult to determine the correct auditing mechanism that sufficiently reassures stakeholders. The economic and public policy environments play an important role in determining the optimal regulatory structures in this case.

With respect to public attitudes, this deliverable contributes significantly to the overall SECONOMICS framework. It presents an innovative research-focused analysis of public attitudes towards the various security issues highlighted in the project, drawn from a study of the media's own published articles. This work is vital in describing many of the behavioural characteristics needed in the economic and risk-modelling work.

This deliverable focuses on a comparative analysis of discourses and justifications of security and risk in domestic and international media. The identification of effective channels and patterns of communication and risk prevention for specific target groups is a fundamental topic that needs to be explored. The report is based on the results of the *Prague Graduate School in Comparative Qualitative Analysis 2013*, a comparative analysis of domestic and international media and expert blogs from around the world. Junior scholars, together with the Prague SECONOMICS team, wrote ten individual country and blog reports, as well as one comparative report. Appendices 7, 8, and 9 of this deliverable summarises these reports. Furthermore, the best reports have been published in the peer-reviewed Prague SECONOMICS Discussion Papers and are available for download on the SECONOMICS project website¹ and on the IS AS CR website².

In recent years public awareness of security issues has grown exponentially, following numerous scandals which indicate numerous governments prioritize security over privacy


¹Available online at <http://seconomicsproject.eu/downloads> [last visited 7.2.2014].

²Available online at <http://www.soc.cas.cz/en/project/seconomics-socio-economics-meets-security> [last visited 7.2.2014].

and civil liberties and do so in a secretive manner often on (or even beyond) the verge of existing rules and regulations. Thus, as indicated in numerous country reports (Appendix 9), debates about the need for increased protection against global security threats are no longer met with uncritical approval. Rather, citizens demand justifications and answers to the question of who controls the watchmen.

One of the products of the *Prague Graduate School in Comparative Qualitative Analysis 2013* is a corpus of almost 3200 articles on the issues of 3D body scanners, for the airport security case study, Stuxnet, for the critical infrastructure security case study, and CCTV camera systems, for the public transport security case study.

The articles analysed in the study are all drawn from the period between January 2010 and April 2013. Each article was sourced from the two most circulated quality dailies (i.e. mainstream newspapers) in the following countries: the old and the new EU member states of the Czech Republic, Germany, Italy, Poland, Slovakia, Spain, the UK; as well as non-EU member states important in either shaping the global discussions of the selected issues (the USA), or key in providing relevant cultural diversity (Turkey and Mexico). Additionally, four expert security blogs were selected to provide insight into the opinions of the security expert community, in addition to the opinions of the general population provided by the articles. The twenty national newspapers provided over 2800 articles for the given period. The expert blogs contributed approximately 400 articles (for the distribution of the articles across the three issues see the figure below).



Source: Comparative analysis of the SECONOMICS ISASCR media sample

Total number of articles related to 3D body scanners, CCTV cameras, and Stuxnet in 2010-2013 in all countries

The media debates in the studied countries each prioritized a specific aspect of national security - in reaction to the effect of both global events (i.e. terrorist attacks) and domestic developments (economic and political), . Countries that are generally more active on the international scene and/or have had a previous experience with domestic and international terrorism, are generally more exposed to (and hence concerned about) potential terrorist attacks. In these countries (the UK, the US, Spain, and Germany) security measures are high on the policy agenda, as demonstrated by the prioritization of body scanners in airport security and intensified CCTV camera use in counter-

terrorism. In countries with no real danger of a terrorist attack by (international/national) extremist groups (Poland, the Czech Republic, Slovakia), there is a low policy interest in advanced and costly security devices, such as body scanners at airports and CCTV cameras, are seen positively as a crime prevention measure.

Comparative Assessment of the Salience of Security Measures

Salience / Measure	3D Body scanners	Stuxnet	CCTV cameras
Low salience	Turkey Poland Mexico	Italy Poland Slovakia	US Italy Poland UK Expert blogs
Medium Salience	Czech Republic Slovakia Spain Italy Expert blogs	Czech Republic Spain Turkey	Mexico Spain
High Salience	US UK Germany	US Germany Mexico UK Expert blogs	Turkey Slovakia Czech Republic Germany

Source: Comparative analysis of the SECONOMICS ISASCR media sample

Still, developments in 2013 show that acceptance of security measures depends on the perception of these as both legal and legitimate, regulated by laws that maintain appropriate scrutiny. Hence the attempts of countries to justify installation of CCTV cameras as a crime prevention measure whilst seeking to enhance counter-terrorism backfires and deteriorates public trust, as seen in the UK case study (Hronesova, Guasti, and Caulfield 2013).

However, it is not only experience with terrorist attempts and threats that determines the attention paid by media to different security measures and tools. It is also the nature of these measures and tools and the extent of their applicability to the domestic context. This also influences the composition of actors who communicate with the public through printed media. In the case of CCTV cameras, journalists dominate the debate; they were the most important actors in seven countries. Stuxnet represents a special case among the three selected topics, as it does not directly affect individual security, but national security. It is also a highly complex technical issue. Hence experts mainly speak about Stuxnet. In the debate about 3D body scanners, many different actors were



involved. Here, the United States is indisputably the leading country in the debate about 3D body scanners and the remaining nine countries in the sample are rather reactive to the US in terms of actors, patterns of interaction, topics, and justifications.

Dominant actors in the analyzed countries for CCTV cameras, Stuxnet, and 3D body scanners

Actors	CCTV cameras	Stuxnet	3D body scanners
Journalists	Spain Czech Republic Poland Slovakia Germany Great Britain USA	Spain Mexico Poland	Spain Czech Republic Poland Great Britain
Experts		Italy Germany Great Britain USA	Czech Republic
State institutions			Mexico Poland
Politicians	Italy		Italy Germany
Private company	Mexico	Czech Republic	
Transport Security Agency			Czech Republic USA

Source: Comparative analysis of the SECONOMICS ISASCR media sample

Note: More than one dominant actor in the country means that there were more actors with the same number of codes.

In this deliverable, we hope to fill a gap in the study of security and security risks by presenting a comparison of the coverage of transnational security issues in the media outlets of ten countries. We find that the media landscape, although fragmented and largely confined to the boundaries of nation-states, is undergoing a transformation as the importance of the international context grows. At the same time, the media is

shifting from a focus on security threats to an awareness of the possible trade-offs of security measures in terms of health, privacy, freedom, and civil liberties. Security related-issues, such as surveillance, the right to privacy, and that right's protection, are not clearly defined in static terms. Rather, their perception is influenced by the security context, mass media, cultural variables, laws, and particular context of specific state. Simultaneously, the public is becoming more sensitive not only to threats but also to the costs of security.

As an important part of this deliverable, we have formulated several policy recommendations based on our extensive study. Most importantly, we recommend the establishment of EU-wide independent, critical, and accessible news sources. These would provide an arena for the development of a transnational perspective on security issues, investigative journalism, and citizen journalism. It would also provide a platform for the discussion of security beyond the boundaries of the nation-state. Furthermore, this would strengthen the EU's voice and also make it a moderator of these security debates, enhancing its standing and allowing it to ensure a diversity of opinion by stimulating discussion across the demographic spectrum. It can achieve this by cultivating existing forums like the print media, but also by venturing into new venues of discourse, such as social media, so that the EU becomes a recognized and active participant in the security debate.

1. Introduction

This deliverable presents a comparative analysis of discourses and justifications of security and risk in domestic and international media in ten countries both within and outside of the EU, as well as in four security expert blogs. The reason for choosing media analyses is that communication channels and communication patterns between policy makers, stakeholders, and citizens in the area of security and risk is currently under-researched, and the media offers a good basis for a comparative analysis of the topic. The identification of effective channels and patterns of communication and risk prevention for relevant target groups is a fundamental topic and will thus provide an important scientific and practical contribution to the field. The deliverable examines the trade-offs between security and its costs in terms of possible environmental and privacy issues, as well as health and civil rights/legality and legitimacy issues. The comparative qualitative media analysis highlighted some major issues in the public media debates in the countries studied, as well as variation in attitudes towards regulatory structures and different levels/types of security.

2. Methodology

In ‘ideal’ democratic societies, media communication fulfills the following five functions. First, media informs citizens about what is happening around them. This is the monitoring function of the media. Second, it educates the public about the meaning and significance of the ‘facts’ it reports. The importance of this function explains why journalists take the accusation that they have lost their objectivity so seriously, since their value as educators presumes a professional detachment from the issues they analyze. Third, media provides a platform for public political discourse, facilitating the formation of ‘public opinion,’ and feeding that opinion back to the public from whence it came. But this function must include space for the expression of dissent, without which the notion of democratic consensus would be meaningless. Fourth, media provides oversight of political and government institutions - performing the ‘watchdog’ role of journalism. Fifth, media in democratic societies also serves as a channel for the advocacy of political viewpoints. This function may also be considered to be persuasion (McNair 2011).

To adequately persuade the public, and thus for the ‘public sphere’ to exist, a number of conditions have to be met. According to Habermas, the political discourse circulated by the media must be first comprehensible to citizens. Second, it must be truthful in so far as it reflects the genuine and sincere intentions of speakers. Third, the means of transmitting information must be accessible to those who can be influenced by it. Finally, there must be an institutional guarantee for the public sphere to exist. In short, democracy presumes an open state in which people are allowed to participate in decision-making and are given access to the media and other information networks through which advocacy occurs (Habermas 1996, McNair 2011).

In the study of risk perception, the analysis of quantitative data done in D4.2 offers

important insights into and a general overview of citizens' perceptions and attitudes toward risk and security, the conditionality of these views, and their attitudes about the various trade-offs (Mansfeldova et al. 2013). However, given the limited availability of relevant current data, we outline an alternative strategy in the conclusions which allows us to obtain our own data directly related to research needs of the SECONOMICS project. Media analysis itself is particularly useful as media serves as a communication channel between policy makers, stake holders, and citizens as they debate the merits of security measures. Analysis of it can reveal the patterns of this debate, and also offers a good basis for a comparative analysis, but the field is currently under-researched. The identification of effective channels and patterns of communication and risk prevention for relevant target groups will thus provide an important scientific and practical contribution to the field (these topics are covered in the forthcoming deliverable D4.3).

Following a series of consultations, we identified three themes particularly salient in the current media and relevant for comparative qualitative analysis (3D body scanners, Stuxnet, and CCTV camera systems). Relevant articles from the two most read quality dailies in each country that were published between January 2010 and April 2013, i.e. 40 months, were deemed satisfactory to cover recent developments in the area. Criteria for country selection included EU member states (both new and old, with priority given to countries relevant to the case study partners - the Czech Republic, Germany, Italy, Poland, Slovakia, Spain, and the UK) as well as non-EU member states important in either shaping global discussions about the selected issues (the USA) or key in providing relevant cultural diversity (Mexico and Turkey). Additionally, four expert security blogs were selected to provide insight into the opinions of the security expert community, in addition to the opinions of the general population provided by the articles. As a result of technical problems it was not possible to perform an in-depth qualitative analysis of the Turkish press, but this only affected the general data.

After the identification of the relevant topics, the time frame, and the countries, we prepared a comprehensive analytical framework, elaborated the structure and content of the training for the country experts³, identified the relevant media outlets for each country (the two principle quality dailies with the highest circulation, one left-leaning and one right-leaning per country), and, most importantly, recruited junior researchers and trained them to use the Atlas.ti program for qualitative analysis.

The Prague SECONOMICS team elaborated three coding schemes (one for each topic - 3D body scanners, Stuxnet, and CCTV cameras). Then they tested them and finalized them over several rounds of pre-tests on all the selected countries. The role of the coding scheme as a research tool is twofold - first, it provides structure and guidelines for the analysis, and second, it ensures the comparability of the individual national reports. For

³This form of media analysis was developed and successfully applied to number of issues such as EU constitutional ratification (Rakusanova 2006, Liebert, Gattig and Evas 2013), Euroscepticism (de Wilde and Trenz 2009, de Wilde, Michailidou and Trenz 2013), EU legitimacy (Guasti 2013), and presidential speeches (Rakusanova 2007). In the SECONOMIC project this methodology was further enhanced and proved an efficient tool for cross-national comparative media analysis.

a full summary of the coding schemes see Appendix 5.

The qualitative sample included between 40 to 45 articles per country selected to fulfil the following criteria - representativeness regarding coverage over time, per newspaper and per topic. For each country we prepared an individual matrix and supervised the selection of articles. In the comparative analysis both the proportions of coverage per topic and the total number of articles per country were considered in order to maintain representativeness and comparability.

A further measure utilised to ensure tool validity was an intercoder reliability test; this was performed regularly throughout the pre-test and main coding periods. In this exercise, each coder had to code an English language article, using the existing coding scheme; results were subsequently evaluated and compared in terms of the extent to which all coders identified the same coding sequences and applied the same codes to these.

The intercoder reliability varied between 80 and 90%, which, from a methodological perspective, is an excellent result in international and multicultural comparative research. The results of the intercoder reliability test were extensively discussed within the SECONOMICS expert group and, when necessary, also with individual coders whose coding stood as outliers. This tool proved to be crucial in providing an understanding of the general logic of qualitative comparative analysis, giving insight into the coded material, as well as the ability to fully grasp the meaning behind the individual codes.

Both during the pre-test and main coding period, the minimum discursive elements of a coded statement included the following (1) Actors: a determination of which actors were taking part in the communication (both in terms of origin and type) and what were the dominant patterns of interaction among them; (2) Topics: an account of how the discussion of each topic was structured by choice of or focus on specific subject matter; (3) Argumentative strategies: a description of the ways in which statements were structured (definitive, evaluative and advocative strategies⁴) with a focus on the positive and negative aspects of evaluative and advocative statements; (4) Motivations and justifications: an analysis of major recognized motives (providing an answer to the question of why a certain statement is used and how it is validated) brought to the fore or denied by dominant actors, with special attention paid to ideas about security, privacy, and freedom.

Our main task was to conceptualise security and risk as a social phenomenon and to analyse their mutual interplay in public opinion and attitudes. We also sought to identify policy interactions between policy makers, industry (stakeholders), and citizens (consumers). We have used the method of comparative qualitative analysis as a tool for

⁴Three argumentative categories are recognized and conceptualised following Dryzek and Berejikan: (1) Definitive: focused on the meaning of terms; (2) Evaluative: evaluation of positive or negative statement of worth; (3) Advocative: determining the desirability/non-desirability of given elements (Dryzek, Berejikian 1993).

obtaining qualitative data for comparative analysis of risk and security discourses and patterns of communication. This tool enabled us to identify effective channels and patterns of communication and risk prevention for relevant target groups, but also generate a unique corpus of comparative data on nine countries over the period of 40 months. The interim product is a corpus of almost 3200 articles related to issues of 3D body scanners, Stuxnet, and CCTV camera systems.

The twenty national newspapers (Table 1) contributed over 2800 articles for the given period, with expert blogs contributing approximately 400 articles. In all countries we selected one left-wing and one right-wing media outlet. In Spain, though, we selected one national and one Catalan daily because the case study on public transportation was more relevant in Barcelona.

Table 1: Overview of selected media

<i>Country</i>	<i>Media</i>
Czech Republic	Mladá fronta Dnes, Právo
Germany	Süddeutsche Zeitung, Frankfurter Allgemeine
Great Britain	The Telegraph and The Guardian
Italy	La Repubblica, Il Giornale
Mexico	La Jordana, La Reforma
Poland	Gazeta Wyborcza, Rzeczpospolita
Slovakia	SME, Pravda
Spain	El Pais, La Vanguardia
Turkey	TIME (ZAMAN), SPOKESMAN (SOZCU)
USA	The New York Times, The Wall Street Journal
<i>Blogs</i>	The Register; HITB - Hack in the Box; RW - Roger-Wilco; Bemosa


In the following figures we offer a comparative preview of the salience of the three selected issues in the ten countries over time.

Table 2: Total number of articles identified in the selected media outlets between 2010 and 2013 (N = number of articles)

	CD body scanner				Stuxnet				CCTV cameras			
	2010	2011	2012	2013	2010	2011	2012	2013	2010	2011	2012	2013
Czech Republic	35	9	2	2	6	14	19	1	48	47	42	21
Germany	47	7	6	2	25	21	23	2	83	15	19	29
Italy	49	5	1	1	8	0	2	2	7	4	12	12
Mexico	13	0	3	0	20	15	23	1	17	29	35	16
Poland	8	1	0	0	7	7	13	4	10	9	21	2
Slovakia	24	3	1	1	7	10	14	3	71	85	97	42
Spain	40	3	4	1	21	20	14	2	27	22	15	3
Turkey	1	1	1	0	13	13	10	0	243	243	393	122
United Kingdom	44	14	6	1	12	25	19	3	17	12	11	3
United States	72	18	26	6	18	22	38	9	2	7	3	3
TOTAL national newspaper samples	333	61	50	14	137	147	175	27	525	473	648	253

Source: Comparative analysis of the SECONOMICS ISASCR media sample


In the following three figures we provide a comparative perspective on strength of salience over time in the countries under study for each issue individually.



Source: Comparative analysis of the SECONOMICS ISASCR media sample

Figure 1: The Salience of the 3D body scanner issue in the media between 2010 and 2013 (N = number of articles)

The corpus of articles on 3D body scanners comprises almost 500 articles. As Figure 1 demonstrates, the most articles in this sample were identified in the US media, followed by the UK and Germany. We can say that the issue of 3D body scanners was most salient in these three countries and least salient in Turkey, Poland, and Mexico. Furthermore, Figure 1 also demonstrates that 3D body scanners were most salient in 2010 (333 articles) and is gradually becoming less salient over time (14 articles in total for the first four months of 2013).




Source: Comparative analysis of the SECONOMICS ISASCR media sample

Figure 2: The Salience of the Stuxnet issue in the media between 2010 and 2013 (N = number of articles)

The corpus of articles on Stuxnet also comprises almost 500 individual stories. As Figure 2 shows, most articles in this sample were identified in the US media, followed by Germany, Mexico, and the UK. We can say that the issue of Stuxnet was most salient in these four countries and least salient in Italy, Poland, and Slovakia. Furthermore, Figure 2 also demonstrates that Stuxnet was most salient in 2012 (175 articles) and that salience is rather stable over time, though there is a slight drop in 2013 (27 articles in total for the first four months of 2013).

The corpus of articles on CCTV cameras (Figure 3) is significantly larger than the previous two and comprises also almost 1900 articles. Furthermore, in Figure 3 Turkey can be clearly identified as an outlier, as it contributes 1000 articles to the overall sample. The salience of CCTV cameras in Turkish media is a product of the frequent use of CCTV cameras in the country, as well as its utilization by police during investigations. Nonetheless, even without Turkey CCTV cameras would still remain the most salient issue. As Figure 3 demonstrates, most articles in this sample were identified in Turkish media, followed by Slovakian, Czech, and German media. It is also important to note that the selection concentrated on articles referring to the use of CCTV cameras in public transport. This restriction was applied to eliminate possible inflation of the sample by articles related to the general use of CCTV cameras in criminal investigations. In Figure 3 we also see that the issue was least salient in the US, Italy, Poland and the UK. Furthermore, Figure 3 also demonstrates that the salience of CCTV cameras is relatively stable over time with subtle growth in 2013 (253 articles, or 131 excluding Turkey for the first four months of 2013).



Source: Comparative analysis of the SECONOMICS ISASCR media sample

Figure 3: The Salience of the CCTV camera issue in the media between 2010 and 2013 (N = number of articles)

This initial analysis provides interesting insights into the salience of the three selected issues over time and across the ten countries under study. It also provides insight into the construction of the SECONOMICS media corpus and methodological issues considered, which ensure the validity of the comparative findings.

2.1. Selection of topics for media analysis and its justification - in connection with the three case studies.

After the identification of relevant topics, time frame, and countries, a comprehensive analytical framework was prepared (the coding scheme is in Annex 5). The training for country experts led them to identify relevant media outlets for each country. Then a group of junior researchers were recruited and trained. The researchers were recruited from graduate students of various social science disciplines across Europe (and from the USA) with academic background relevant to media analysis and linguistic and cultural skills. Their main task was to collect and analyze articles from the national press that covered the three topics over the given period, as well as provide an analysis of the media landscape in the country.

For all three case studies (WP1, 2 and 3), we have (together with the case study experts) selected topics, which are relevant both for the case studies and for the main topic of

WP4 - the tension between economics, security, and freedom. Based on consultations with the SECONOMICS case study partners, the salience⁵ of three current media themes was identified as relevant for the comparative qualitative analysis: 3D body scanners for airport security case study, Stuxnet for the critical infrastructure security case study, and CCTV camera systems for the public transport security case study.

2.1.1. 3D body scanner - European Regulatory Framework for 3D Body Scanners

According to Regulation EC 300/2008, the European Commission allows member States to adopt specific security measures designed to amend obsolete elements of common basic standards on aviation security. These measures also include “methods of screening, individually or in combination, as a primary or secondary means and under defined conditions.” Draft Regulation 300/2008 included 3D body scanners amongst the potential allowed European airport screening technologies.

European Parliament was not completely satisfied with this potential introduction of 3D body scanners and there were several discussions and new documents proposed (more details Annex 6). But just after the failed Christmas 2009 attack on a flight from Amsterdam to Detroit, 3D body scanner systems again became a priority on the political agenda at an international level.

The European Parliament voted in July 2011 on resolution which stated that 3D body scanners should be allowed at EU airports only if “the health, dignity, and privacy of passengers are protected.” The European Parliament accepted that body scanners would enhance aviation security, but asked member states “to deploy technology which is the least harmful for human health” and addresses privacy concerns. Due to health risks “scanners using ionising radiation should be prohibited in the EU.” The discussion has continued also after this resolution and new documents were adopted. In general, it is seems that 3D body scanner adoption is still debated and their implementation in many countries was suspended.

2.1.2. Stuxnet

CCTV cameras and 3D Body scanners are technologies used to prevent traditional crime and modern terrorism as well as detect perpetrators. However, another area in the field of security studies, criminology, and counter-terrorism has become salient in the discourse over modern security risks - cyber-crime. Cyber-crime uses information systems and technology to commit extortion, identity theft, espionage, or even paralyze and/or destroy critical infrastructure. Though there have been many examples of these

⁵Salience is a term in public opinion, communication and policy research; originally developed in semiotics and referred to the relative prominence of a sign; in communication research salience refers to the accessibility of frames (i.e. narrative structures in which information are presented) in (mass) communication.

viruses in recent years, in June 2010 the US and Israel developed the most famous of these weapons, a virus that interfered with uranium enrichment at the Natanz Iranian nuclear facility, opening a new era of cyber warfare. Stuxet was a highly sophisticated piece of malware, which targeted a very particular section of the Iranian nuclear facility (Collins and McCombie 2012).

In response to the media reports of the attack, numerous governments called for international coordination on cyber security strategies while also trying to secure an advantage in cyberspace (Farwell and Rohozinski 2011, 31). The reason why Stuxnet has shaken public views of cyber security is that it was unprecedented in its scope and effectiveness. It is a “sophisticated computer program designed to penetrate and establish control over remote systems in a quasi-autonomous fashion” (Farwell and Rohozinski 2011, 24). It has also shown that cyberspace is less costly and risky to use against enemies than traditional military means. In response to these developments, the British Government responded with the release of National Security Strategy (NSS) and Strategic Defence and Security Review (SDSR) in October 2010 and devoted over £650 million to increase cyber security (Cornish et al. 2011). However, a clear roadmap, which would structure best practice and transparency in cyber protection, is still under development.

In the SECONOMICS project, critical infrastructures are a unique case. Unlike air and public transport, the end user is not an individual (a consumer or passenger, as in the previous case), but transmission networks and their stakeholders. Therefore this security technology does not immediately affect the public, but it can have an unprecedented impact on their lives. As mentioned in D2.4 (version 0.1, p. 7) “government has a responsibility on behalf of society to ensure that the providers protect the essential systems and services that are critical to the nation.” For that reason, it is desirable for people to be informed about security tools and possible threats that the tools might be misused in cyber crime.

Stuxnet was selected as an issue as it introduced cyber terrorism and certain vulnerabilities in critical infrastructure to the public debate. From late 2010 through the present, this topic has shown great potential in reaching both policy makers and the public, generating debate in both general and special-interest media, namely expert blogs.

2.1.3. CCTV cameras

We selected CCTV cameras as an example of a technology whose social acceptance varies across different countries. According to David Lyon (2002), surveillance, as one method of ensuring security, can be placed on a spectrum that ranges between “care” and “control”. At one end “care” stands for watching over society for purpose of protection. “Control,” on the other hand, consists of scrutinizing people’s behaviour to enforce discipline and order.

As far as discourses about perceptions of security and surveillance, Barnard-Wills, in his analysis of media practices of surveillance, found out that there are two lines of argumentation presented by the press. The first is framed around a discourse of “appropriate surveillance,” which plays upon the prevention of crime, terrorism, and the protection of national security. The second, which he calls the “discourse of inappropriate surveillance,” mobilizes discourses of privacy, “Big Brother,” and personal liberty (Barnard-Wills 2011).

Surveillance has serious implications with regard to human rights and privacy. By its very nature the use of CCTV cameras undermines citizens’ fundamental right to privacy as anchored in Article 8 of the European Convention on Human Rights. Some CCTV devices even record sound, further increasing their level of invasiveness in a person’s private life (Schlehahn et al. 2013).

Although the public is increasingly sensitive to issues of privacy, according to several studies by Barnard-Wills (2011) the press has been very positive about the installation of CCTV cameras and often highlights the successes of surveillance practices (this is also confirmed by a number of our media country reports, especially Spain, Poland and Slovakia). CCTV cameras are seen as a proper tool for fighting crime and vandalism. The public perception of CCTV cameras thus oscillates between positive reception (as crime detection tool) and a more problematic (as “anti-terrorism” tool maneuvering legal lacunae between legality and legitimacy, and in view of its numerous opponents lack of theoroff).

3. Media landscape in countries covered by research

The national reports clearly showed a necessity to be aware of existing ties between political actors and the media, which have important implications for any media analysis. Although our sample of countries are highly diverse and include both Central European (Czech Republic, Slovakia, Poland) and West European countries (Germany, Italy, Spain, United Kingdom), together with two overseas countries (USA and Mexico), we can discern some global trends in the media sector, as well as some diversity. In particular, the analyzed sample and time period point towards some major changes in ownership structures and regulatory frameworks. The main focus here is on the print press and its online versions, which were used in the national reports.

The global economic downturn of the past five years has hit the media sector hard. Profit margins are much lower than in the 1990s, several news outlets were forced to lay off investigative and international journalists, reduce outputs, and limit the number of overseas branches. Media content turned towards entertainment and tabloid-style news for commercial purposes. This has led to a negative trend in the media referred to as “infotainment,” i.e. the presentation of news information in an entertaining and more appealing form (Belakova 2013a). More importantly, media independence has suffered by an increased dependency on governments and large business to support their ventures. Political and business interests have crept into the media, affecting its content,

especially in countries which were particularly hard hit by the crisis. On the positive side, recent media development has also seen a great technologization of news reporting and a preference for online platforms due to their efficiency, accessibility, and lower cost (Hronesova, Guasti and Caulfield 2013).

While stressing these underlying factors and global pressures on the media sector, the national case studies included in the national media analyses highlight several regional and national characteristics. The global economic malaise of the past few years has had a clearly negative impact on the media sector in the studied countries. Ownership has slowly shifted into the hands of a few businessmen and tycoons, while ownership restrictions have relaxed limits on market share (with the exception of the UK). The quality of the produced news and analyses has also suffered under financial constraints. Journalists have been faced with unprecedented financial challenges, whereby they often had to compromise their journalistic ethics for commercial profit. This has resulted in growing self-censorship, though that is difficult to measure.

In addition, there has been increasing political meddling in editorial policies and news content, as media owners often have close ties to main political actors. There is a clear difference in terms of freedom of press and the quality of journalism across the studied countries, though. While Central European media score highly in measures of media freedom, the quality of news reporting is much lower, and informative, rather than analytical, pieces dominate. On the other hand, both the United Kingdom and the United States provide investigative and analytical news reporting at highest professional journalistic standards. Italy and Spain struggle with the influence of big business and politics over media content, but still offer diversified and quality journalistic reporting. Lastly, Mexico is a clear outlier in the set of analyzed countries and was even assessed as the most dangerous country for journalists on both American continents, mainly due to the on-going cartel wars (Table 3).

Table 3: World Freedom of the Press, 2013

Country	Rating	World Rank
Czech Republic	10.17	16
Germany	10.24	17
Poland	13.11	22
Slovakia	13.25	23
United Kingdom	16.89	29
United States	18.22	32
Spain	20.50	36
Italy	26.11	57
Mexico	45.30	153

Sources: World Press Freedom 2013, Reporters without Borders

4. The Domestic and International Context

In recent years security threats such as terrorist attacks, global organized crime, and cyber attacks have come to the forefront of world attention, creating a new setting for worldwide security challenges. As analyzed in the SECONOMICS country reports, the 21st century faces a post-modern challenges and risks that spring from with latest technological developments which have created a whole new virtual world that is as open to crime as it is to legitimate uses. Terrorist attacks, intelligence leaks, as well as direct or indirect participation in global or national cyber-attacks have significantly influenced the latest policy priorities in the field of national security. The protracted financial crisis has further intensified concerns for public safety as crime normally grows during times of economic malaise.

These developments have been reflected in the national security concerns and strategies⁶ of all studied countries, which have reacted by adopting new security laws and measures. Over the first four months of 2013 and after a series of high-profile leaks of top-secret intelligence data have risen questions about the legality of security practices used by national governments. These eye-opening events have intensified debates about the power of the national intelligence services. Whistleblowers, such as Bradley Manning and Edward Snowden, as well as Wikileaks founder Julian Assange, have brought to light the scope of these secretive intrusions by the state into the private lives of its citizens. These intrusions are usually justified by the war on terror. As seen in the individual country reports, negative perceptions of security and the question of who directs the controllers have gone hand in hand with debates about the need for increased protection from global crime.

In view of these global events and considering domestic political and economic developments, each of the studied countries has prioritized a specific aspect of its national security. Countries which are generally more active on the international scene or have had a previous experience with domestic and international terrorism are generally more exposed to (and hence more concerned about) potential terrorist attacks. Such countries (the UK, the US, Spain, and Germany) prioritized airport security in the form of body scanners and intensified CCTV coverage (Nitschke 2013).

On the contrary, in countries with no real danger of a terrorist attack by international extremist groups there is a little interest in advanced and costly security devices, such as full body scanners. Although some countries in Central Europe, such as Poland and the Czech Republic, have taken part in the global war on terror by contributing their soldiers to military actions, their governments' assessment of potential terrorist risk is very low (Sojka 2013). Nonetheless, surveillance remains topical in these countries as a method of improving overall public safety - especially in capitals and transportation hubs. In summary, in the studied period concerns about national and public security have run very high in all studied countries, though for different reasons.

⁶Among the studied countries Italy is the only one with no clear security strategy (see de Gramatica 2013).

In 2013, the countries under study have been influenced both by domestic political developments and domestic crime, as well as by international political developments, especially related to the ongoing military actions in Afghanistan and Iraq. In the aftermath of reoccurring terrorist attacks, law-enforcement authorities and politicians periodically called for the introduction of more advanced surveillance technologies, including face recognition and full body imaging technology. Even in countries with less exposure to terrorism, concerns about growing crime under the conditions of an economic crisis, as well as the global emergence of cybercrime, have prompted stricter security measures. It can be expected that post-modern security risks will only intensify with advancing modern technologies. As a consequence, a growing concern for the respect of privacy and intimacy - both physically and virtually - will require an adequate legal response from individual states.

5. Comparative media analysis

Comparative analysis is the core of this deliverable, based on this project's national reports and merged data set. Comparison is done separately for the three case study-based topics in 9 countries and for 4 security related expert blogs. The reason for including blogs was two-fold; first, they capture the growing importance of alternative information sources, and second this includes information sources written for an expert audience, rather than a general one, like the newspaper articles. This allows us to compare the extent to which general and expert debates converge. The full version of the comparative report is in Annex 7.

The three topics that we included in the analysis didn't attract the same level of attention equally across the countries studied (Table 4). The United States was a leading country in the discussion of 3D body scanners and Stuxnet, providing the discourse for the rest of the countries that we have analyzed. On the other hand, in the third analyzed topic it played only a marginal role. CCTV cameras caused drew great attention and fomented much controversy in Poland and Germany. Poland is among the strongest supporters of CCTV cameras, while German articles showed it stood on the opposite side, mostly arguing against these devices.

Table 4: Comparative Assessment of the Saliency of Security Measures

Saliency Measure /	3D Body scanner	Stuxnet	CCTV cameras
Low saliency	Turkey Poland Mexico	Italy Poland Slovakia	US Italy Poland UK Expert blogs

Medium Salience	Czech Republic Slovakia Spain Italy Expert blogs	Czech Republic Spain Turkey	Mexico Spain
High Salience	US UK Germany	US Germany Mexico UK Expert blogs	Turkey Slovakia Czech Republic Germany

Source: Comparative analysis of the SECONOMICS ISASCR media sample

Salience is a term in public opinion, communication, and policy research which originally developed in semiotics and referred to the relative prominence of signs. In communication research salience refers to the accessibility of frames (i.e. narrative structures in which information are presented) in (mass) communication. For the purpose of this study, salience is defined as the public perception and reception of security issues and, more specifically, of security measures; for this purpose salience signifies the degree of acceptance (positive salience) and the degree of rejection (negative salience).

We use media salience, either strong or negative, as an indicator of the potential acceptance of security measures. For security measures to be accepted, the predominant direction of media salience ought to be positive. Depending on its strength and context, negative salience signifies a rejection of a security measure and a failure on the part of that security measures' proponents to communicate the need for that measure effectively.

5.1. Who and how communicates with the citizens - Actors and Argumentative strategies

In Table 5 we can see the actors that dominated in the countries we have analyzed, i.e. who communicated with the citizens through media. In the case of CCTV cameras, journalists dominate. The latter were the most important actor in seven countries. In Italy, politicians' statements prevail, which is typical for all 3 analyzed topics in Italy. Stuxnet is a topic framed mainly by experts, as they are the dominate actor in four countries. In the debate about 3D body scanners, many different actors took part in the debate and dominance is not so clear.

Table 5: Dominant actors in the analyzed countries for CCTV cameras, Stuxnet, and 3D body scanners

Actors	CCTV cameras	Stuxnet	3D body scanners
Journalists	Spain Czech Republic Poland Slovakia Germany Great Britain USA	Spain Mexico Poland	Spain Czech Republic Poland Great Britain
Experts		Italy Germany Great Britain USA	Czech Republic
State institutions			Mexico Poland
Politicians	Italy		Italy Germany
Private company	Mexico	Czech Republic	
Transport Security Agency			Czech Republic USA

Source: Comparative analysis of the SECONOMICS ISASCR media sample

Note: More than one dominant actor in the country means that there were more actors with the same number of codes

Regarding argumentative strategies, there was a dominance of definitive and neutral argumentative styles in all the three cases. However, discussions of 3D body scanners and CCTV cameras in the press contained quite a high number of evaluative strategies as well. Only Stuxnet can be seen as almost strictly framed in a definitive and neutral way. That is understandable as the topic is remote from the general public due to its technical character and thus needs to be brought to the audience first by giving an explanation of what is actually going on. Table 6 shows the above-average use of particular argumentative strategies in the three topics. That is, which country used the distinct category of argumentation more, compared to the other countries. In case of evaluative and advocative statements, it reveals to us where the discussion about the

distinct topic was developed the most and where the character of the articles was only informative.

Table 6: Above-average frequency of argumentative strategies in analyzed countries for CCTV cameras, Stuxnet, and 3D body scanners

Argumentative strategies	CCTV cameras	Stuxnet	3D body scanner
Definitive	Spain Czech Republic Poland Slovakia Great Britain	Spain Slovakia Great Britain USA	Spain Great Britain USA
Evaluative	Poland Slovakia Germany	Germany USA	Germany USA
Advocative	Poland Slovakia USA	Great Britain USA	Spain Italy Slovakia USA

Source: Comparative analysis of the SECONOMICS ISASCR media sample
 Note: Countries that dominated in each category are highlighted.


The United States is indisputably the leading country in the debate about 3D body scanners, according to the number of different actors providing statements in the press. The discussion there began after the failed terrorist attack on the Detroit-Amsterdam flight in 2009. The most influential actor providing statements in the US is the Transportation Security Administration arguing for the implementation of body scanners. A lot of space in the media is given to experts who were mainly speaking about the health risks of the scanners and evaluating them negatively. The rest of the countries are rather reactive to the events happening in the US. In Great Britain and Spain there is a strong voice of journalists themselves in the statements. Italy stands as an exception to the other countries, as there politicians have the strongest voice in the media debate. Slovakia, Poland, the Czech Republic, Spain, and Mexico did not pay much attention to this issue, judging by the number and quality of articles published. They mostly just reprinted US or other foreign articles and reported on the case at hand. Great Britain and Italy can be seen as supporters of this technology in the EU, while the rest of the covered countries evaluate it rather negatively judging by the analyzed articles. It is important though, to discuss this topic at the European level. The regulation of the use of 3D body scanners is now in the hands of the member states. But for better use of this device, considering its weaknesses as well as strengths, it would be helpful to settle some common criteria for the entire EU.

Stuxnet represents a special case among our three topics. It does not directly affect the public, but it can have unprecedented consequences for their lives. Therefore, it is desirable that people are informed about these issues. It was first discussed in 2010 following the cyber-attacks on the Iranian power plant. At the beginning it was framed almost entirely in a definitive way. The leading actors in the statements were experts and various state officials from Iran and the United States. As time passed, the debate moved from specific events to a more abstract level, discussing potential cyber war and citing a wider variety of actors who were not strictly experts. The evaluative strategies used in the articles about Stuxnet were mostly negative, but we can say generally that, besides the US, countries played the role of a detached observer, rather than forming any significant opinion of their own about the case. The only exception was Mexico, where some articles included a fear of being similarly targeted in the future, identifying itself rather with the victims than with the perpetrators of the attack.

The last topic, CCTV cameras, garnered much attention in the studied countries and the roles of the debates' leaders changed completely in comparison to the other two topics. The USA, unlike in the other two cases, did not play any important role. CCTV cameras apparently do not cause major controversies there. They attracted more attention only after the attack at Boston Marathon in April 2013 when they helped to reveal the culprits. The leaders of the debate about CCTV cameras among our selected countries were Poland and Germany, though they stood on opposite sides of the debate. While Poland evaluates the use of CCTV camera use positively, viewing it as part of the country's modernization, Germany considers the use of CCTV cameras to be negative and a threat to privacy. The main actors providing statements in the articles about CCTV cameras, apart from journalists themselves, were various state institutions. In Italy, again, we saw politicians providing the information and opinions about CCTV cameras. In Mexico the most frequent actors were private companies working on the installation of CCTV devices. The debate about CCTV cameras is mostly framed in domestic terms and is relatively distinct in each of the analyzed countries. It is connected to cultural differences, the security situation in the country, and its past experience with terrorist attacks.

5.2. The most Salient Topics and Justifications Related to the 3D body scanners, CCTV Camera Systems and Virus Stuxnet


An overview of the total number of topics and justifications for all three security issues shows us that the most media attention was paid to 3D body scanners and the least to Stuxnet. Despite these differences, the number of articles dedicated to each topic was still relatively equal (Figure 4).



Source: Comparative analysis of the SECONOMICS ISASCR media sample

Figure 4: Total number of the most salient topics related to 3D body scanners, CCTV cameras, and Stuxnet in 2010-2013

Despite this similarity in the number of articles, differences did appear in the number of justifications found in the articles. A relatively low number of justifications was typical for articles about Stuxnet, while articles about CCTV cameras and 3D body scanners include quite a few more justifications (Figure 5).



Source: Comparative analysis of the SECONOMICS ISASCR media sample

Figure 5: Total number of the most salient justifications for 3D body scanners, CCTV cameras, and Stuxnet in 2010-2013

As mentioned above, newspapers paid the most attention to the first security issue of 3D body scanners. However, this fact should be taken with a grain of salt as this fact is the result of the high degree of interest the USA displayed in this topic, significantly skewing and shaping the debate of scanners around the world. In fact, governments installed 3D body scanners in only a few countries, so the topic is in fact not particularly interesting for a relatively large number of the studied countries. It is no surprise that 3D body scanners were salient particularly for the countries where scanners had been implemented (the United States, Great Britain, and Germany) and for the countries with recent experience with the terrorist attacks (the United States, Great Britain, and Spain). Issues surrounding body scanners were also more important in the old EU



member states and the USA than for new member states and Mexico. The most sophisticated debate about 3D body scanners took place in the United States while less attention to this issue was paid in Mexico and Poland.

In most countries newspapers focused on the trade-offs between security, privacy and health. Much attention was paid to the “security rules and regulations,” the “installation of scanners,” and the description of scanning procedures. On one hand, proponents of body scanners argued they were useful for detecting potential attackers and their weapons. They also claimed that the machines were “efficient,” though this has been questioned in some respects. On the other hand, newspapers often claimed that the cost was sometimes too high. Daily newspapers also focused on the scanners' negative aspects, such as their threat to “privacy,” dignity, and freedom. Papers also reported on how they increased discomfort and led to poorer “quality of service.”

Overall, CCTV cameras were the second most salient security issue in terms of its total media coverage. However, it was more salient in more countries than 3D body scanners and Stuxnet (this paradox is a result of different countries contributing differing amounts of materials. This issue was controlled for by combining the overall analysis with in-depth case studies of the individual countries in the comparative analysis). The cause of this was that CCTV cameras were a domestic issue, something interesting and relevant for newspapers readers. No dominant country shaped the debate in the European and worldwide context as the United States did in the case of full body scanners and Stuxnet. CCTV cameras were not even a particularly salient topic in the United States.

CCTV cameras received the most attention in Poland, followed by Spain, Great Britain, and the Czech Republic. It is interesting that new EU member states, such as Poland, Slovakia and the Czech Republic, focused on this issue so much, while they were not particularly interested in 3D body scanners and Stuxnet. The least interest and shallowest debate about cameras was reported in Italy and Mexico. The Mexican and Italian press did not exhibit more attention to 3D body scanners, either, but their media coverage of Stuxnet was an interesting contribution to the debate about the virus.

When reporting on CCTV cameras, newspapers were generally most interested in the systems' “purchase and installation,” “security rules and regulations,” and “surveillance.” The topic of “security rules and regulations” was often considered a negative aspect and was often spoken of in connection with topics such as endangering privacy. In these cases newspapers called for better regulation of CCTV cameras. On the other hand, the purchase and installation of cameras was often framed positively by cameras' proponents as an effective tool for fighting crime. “Efficiency” and “crime prevention” were the most salient justifications for CCTV cameras. Nevertheless, the efficiency of cameras was often questioned, just as it was in the body scanner debate.

An interesting difference appeared between English-speaking countries, Germany, and the remaining studied states. In the USA, Great Britain, and Germany, cameras were considered a useful tool in the fight against domestic and international terrorism. In the

remaining countries, CCTV cameras were not primarily used for counter-terrorism, but were instead considered efficient deterrents of vandalism, robbery, and pickpocketing on public transport. On roads, CCTV cameras in the remaining countries were often framed as a tool for strengthening the security of road traffic.

The last issue, Stuxnet, garnered the least attention in the newspapers analyzed. One reason for this lack of interest could be that, unlike 3D body scanners and CCTV cameras, Stuxnet is not a technology which directly affects the lives of average people, and so information about Stuxnet is not so interesting to the general population. As was true of 3D body scanners, the USA was the leader of this debate, followed Germany and Slovakia.

The articles describing Stuxnet were longer, more detailed, and contained expert opinions more often than the articles describing the functions of CCTV cameras and 3D body scanners. The prevailing topics were “Attack on Iran,” “Iranian enrichment uranium programme,” and “Deployment attack using Stuxnet” and newspapers also speculated about the origin of the virus. Stuxnet was framed in the context of global cyber security, industrial espionage, and cyber war. Newspapers wrote about the wider consequences and negative impacts of the Stuxnet attack on geopolitical stability, such as potential counterattacks, and they discussed the legitimacy of cyber-attacks in regards to international law. Mexican newspapers even approached the topic at times from the Iranian perspective.

Regarding the justifications, proponents of Stuxnet appreciated the complexity and efficiency of the virus and emphasized security. They considered this virus to be a quick and non-violent weapon, useful for preemptive strikes that could prevent the development of weapons of mass destruction. On the other hand, concerns about uncontrolled virus proliferation and the possibility of counterattacks appeared in 2011 and 2012.

6. Comparative analysis of social media - blogs

As a supplement to the printed media analysis, we chose four English-language expert security blogs to gain deeper insight into the communication patterns of those inside the security expert community. Increasingly important, blogs are more and more portrayed as community forums or political outlets, as opposed to the initial understanding of blogs as forms of personal self-expression. Traditional media attention to blogs has also increased dramatically. As the blogosphere has grown, a variety of institutions have adopted the form. Many opinion journals, newspapers, and TV news networks host blogs on their websites. There is also strong evidence that media elites - editors, publishers and columnists - consume political and expert blogs (Drezner and Farrell 2004, 2008), indicating a connection between the political and expert blogosphere with mediasphere. This makes reputable blogs even more relevant and influential within the general media context. For the full version of the report see Annex 8.

The main questions the blog analysis tries to answer are: What is the overall salience of

the selected topics among security bloggers? How do expert blogs frame the implications of security and security technologies in the context of our three SECONOMICS topics? What is the perception of security risks among the security expert blog community? Do questions of security dominate, or questions of privacy? Is the discussion within the community mostly technical, or is it more opinion based?

Altogether we selected four English-language security expert blogs for this analysis: Bemosa⁷, Roger-Wilco⁸, Hack in the Box⁹ (HITB), and The Register¹⁰. For more details about the selection criteria Lacina 2014. The natures of the four selected blogs are rather different in terms of scope, ownership/operatoration, and the type of articles/posts provided. Bemosa and Roger-Wilco are highly specialized, narrow-topic blogs that focus on airport security and air traffic management, respectively. Both are backed by private consulting companies. Further, the Bemosa blog is, in fact, a private blog written by a single individual, prof. Kirschenbaum. In contrast, The Register is rather more a large impact, publisher-owned online magazine or newspaper with a wide variety of topics concerning technology and related fields. It belongs among the leading global websites for IT specialists.

To gather articles for analysis, we searched all four blogs for key words in English - 3D body scanners, Stuxnet, and CCTV cameras. The results were then limited to articles published between 1st January 2010 and 31st April 2013 only. The search returned 345 articles in total, with most articles dealing with Stuxnet, which represented nearly 80% of overall search returns. After examining the articles more closely, we had to exclude a number of them, due to their irrelevance to the objectives of the study, bringing the total number of blog articles to 150. The majority of articles referred to Stuxnet (almost 70%). CCTV cameras were the topic of nearly 20% of the articles, and about 11% of the articles referred to 3D body scanners (Table 7).

Table 7: Overall sample - Relevant articles

Blog	The Register	HITB	RW	Bemosa	Total N	Total %
Topic						
CCTV camera	23	5	0	1	29	19.33
Stuxnet	42	62	0	0	104	69.33
Body scanner	11	2	2	2	17	11.33
Total	76	69	2	3	150	100

Source: Comparative analysis of the SECONOMICS ISASCR media sample

Altogether 41 articles were selected for the purpose of our analysis. The objective was to maintain the overall proportionality of topics and the number of relevant articles

⁷bemosa.blogspot.com

⁸www.roger-wilco.net

⁹www.hitb.org

¹⁰http://www.theregister.co.uk

returned by particular blogs. Table 8 shows the distribution of the final sample of articles selected for analysis.

Table 8: Articles selected for analysis by year

Topic	2010	2011	2012	2013	Total
CCTV	3	3	0	2	8
Stuxnet	5	8	6	5	24
3D body scanner	3	3	1	2	9
Total	11	14	7	9	41

Source: Comparative analysis of the SECONOMICS ISASCR media sample

The main issue discussed in articles we coded on CCTV cameras was the controversy between security and privacy and personal data storage. The most frequent actors were the police (18%) and the advocacy groups of civil society (18%), followed by state institutions (16.7%). Police was mostly mentioned as an actor using CCTV surveillance tools and storing personal data, being criticized by various groups in civil society. The representatives of state institutions were generally defending or talking about security provisions the need for surveillance for the sake of public security. The justification for the actors' arguments could be identified in 23% of statements. As we could already see, the leading justifications were issues of efficiency, often meaning rather low efficiency of CCTV surveillance, and issues of freedom and liberty, followed by costs.

The topic of 3D body scanners relates by definition to the main specialization of the two air traffic and airport security blogs, Bemosa and Roger-Wilco (RW). It was also the only topic in which the RW blog entered our analysis, as the primary search returned only two RW articles, both on the topic of 3D body scanners.

The most frequent actors in the debate were institutions (28%), followed by civil society groups and experts. More specifically, the institutions were mostly EU institutions - the European Parliament, the European Commission as a whole, the EU Transport Commissioner, and the European Economic and Social Committee. These were mentioned mostly in relation to regulations concerning the introduction of 3D body scanners and the debate about their efficiency versus health risks and privacy protection issues. The expert category included mostly health and radiation experts judging the levels of health risks. Advocacy groups of civil society could be divided in two categories - those concerned with privacy issues, such as the Electronic Privacy Information Centre (EPIC) and those concerned with health risks, e.g. The American Pilots Association.

Issues of freedom and terrorism appeared to be not very salient in the debate, which could be surprising in the latter case, as 3D body scanners are, in fact, meant to be a counter-terrorist measure. Apparently, the debate was more concerned with the regulation of full body scanners in terms of privacy and health.

Stuxnet was the most salient topic in the expert blogs. It accounted for almost 70% of the overall relevant articles, which is really a very significant dominance by one topic.

Experts were coded as the most frequent actors (34%), followed by state institutions (22%), and Stuxnet itself (10%). The experts' origin was often not explicitly mentioned, as they were mostly private computer security experts, computer scientists, or legal experts. On the other hand, the origin of the second most frequent actor, state institutions, was often explicitly expressed in the statements. We identified 15 cases of USA state institution actors, including the President of USA, cited "senior USA officials," and Chiefs of Government Departments.

Cyber war was coded as the most frequent theme (14.2%), almost at the same rate as Stuxnet itself (13.6%), followed by themes of attack on Iran, USA, Israel, the development of Stuxnet by a state, and the deployment of and attack by Stuxnet. The vast majority of coded statements were definitive and neutral, since the experts who were the principle actors tended to be objective and neutral. Although we coded more statements than the other two topics, we were able to identify justifications in only one fourth of them. Efficiency was the most frequent justification (29%), followed by defense (20.8%) and preemptive strike (16.7%).

This study provides the results of a qualitative textual analysis of the coverage and discussion of CCTV cameras, Stuxnet, and 3D body scanners in selected expert online blogs between 1 January 2010 and 31 April 2013. We can see that online expert blogs are a unique domain that might differ a lot from the scope and nature of traditional printed media. The significant differences among blogs in terms of scope, ownership/operation, and the type of articles or posts provided, poses serious limitations to the comparability and bias of such analysis. However, it may give valuable insight into the coverage of our three security topics within a highly specialized community. The analysis showed that despite the blogs' specialist audience, the quality of the articles varies greatly, with perhaps the exception of The Register, which proved to be a very sophisticated source of information and in depth-discussion among the community of interested readers. On the other hand, the HITB blog is rather more like a mechanism for making announcements. It concentrates on short reprinted bits of news from the security industry, with a focus on cyber security, but provides very little valuable analysis. The Bemosa and Roger-Wilco blogs, which are very narrow-topic blogs, provided high quality articles, but as a result of such a high specialization, they offered a limited scope of information valuable for the objectives of our study.

7. Policy Recommendations

Our analysis demonstrates that striking a balance between security and freedom is the critical task of contemporary governments and stakeholders. However, they do not strike this balance alone. Indeed, media is of increasing importance as a platform for critical public political discourse and as a guardian of freedoms.

- I. In the 21st century, security threats and security issues are no longer confined by the boundaries of nation states. On the contrary, they are both EU-wide and

global. However, as the present report shows, media reports on security issues remain largely written from a national perspective. Today there is a need in the EU for an expansive, independent, critical, and accessible news source, which would provide an arena for the development of transnational perspectives on security related issues and investigative journalism beyond the boundaries of a nation state.

- II. European institutions can become a moderator of the EU-wide debate on security threats and measures/tools by ensuring some benchmarking for such debates, as well as by creating a space for experts, politicians, watchdogs, and civil society to exchange opinions on the trade-offs between security and privacy, on emerging threats, and on the regulation of new security measures and the social impact of new security measures.
- III. The voice of experts and civil rights groups seems to be underrepresented in traditional print media. There is a need to increase the space given to expert and alternative viewpoints while reporting on security issues from an EU perspective.
- IV. There is an urgent need to increase the involvement of citizens in security debates. This can be facilitated within the above mentioned open news platform, which could also offer space for citizen journalism, expert and citizen blogs, and a discussion forum, among other things. Further interactive features could include online question and answer sessions with high ranking experts, EU security officials, online debates, etc.
- V. In order to increase public awareness as well as social acceptance of existing and new security measures, rather than avoiding critical debate, such debate should be facilitated, critical voices heard, and plurality of positive opinion ensured. The exclusion of critical voices leads to the radicalisation of critics and the fragmentalization of debates. Instead, debates between opponents and proponents of given security measures should follow the appropriate procedures to provide legitimacy and democratic character to debates.
- VI. Targeted discussions at various age levels and social groups using social media is necessary. Information related to security measures must be made accessible to groups with different cognitive abilities, needs and interests.
- VII. It is important to cultivate communication channels with existing print media and journalists, ensuring that the EU position will be reported with its own voice.

8. Conclusions

The focus of the SECONOMICS project is on the definition and perception of risk and security in different settings: airport security and air travel, critical infrastructure, and urban transport. The findings of our qualitative comparative analysis of media perception of terrorism threats and security measures suggest that the way media portrays different security risks depends on several factors. Past experience with a particular security threat, as well as the probability of the country being targeted in the future, account for the main differences in the extent of coverage dedicated to a security issue in the domestic media.

The way the public comes to understand a topic is a balance between their perception of risk and their perception of the pros and cons of a given technological measure, be it 3D body scanners, CCTV cameras, Stuxnet, or something else. Technologies viewed as intrusive receive more negative coverage, even if the risks they try to mitigate are high. This is particularly true of 3D body scanners. In these cases, alternative, less intrusive technological measures are deemed preferable by the media and, by implication, the public. Here, potential terrorist threats do not outweigh the imminent health risks and threats to privacy. But if these measures are forced onto an unwilling public, they may become seen not as a solution, but as yet another threat, and viewed negatively in the media and by the public.

We found a two-step pattern in the analyzed political communication. The first step is the presentation of terrorist threats in general, and the second is the need for security measures, especially 3D body scanners and CCTV cameras. Stuxnet does not strictly fit into this framework, as it is in part presented as a security measure against the Iranian nuclear threat, but it is also framed as a cyber terrorist threat itself, especially after it apparently mutated and attacked companies in the US and Western Europe. But Stuxnet remained an external, international issue with little relevance to the average citizen, especially in states where a terrorist attack is unlikely, such as the Czech Republic, Slovakia, and, to a lesser extent, Poland. But within this two-step pattern, coverage is dominated by the actions and opinions of different foreign states, state institutions and politicians, who debate the merits of introducing various security measures and the related regulations necessary to safeguard citizens' privacy and health. In these debates health, privacy, and dignity concerns prevail over security risks (whose probability is seen as low). In countries where the media is more analytical (Germany, the UK) the media also discussed other trade-offs, such as costs vs. effectiveness and privacy/freedom vs. security.

With regards to the volume of coverage, the Stuxnet attacks were in the middle. The issue was presented as foreign or technological news. In most countries, with the exception of Mexico, the analyzed articles were mostly informative. As a general rule, the coverage followed international developments and information reported by foreign newspapers (mainly from the US and the UK). The overall Stuxnet debate focused on three types of security risks. The first risk was the extensive scope of Iran's nuclear programme. This may indicate that the media believed there is a real possibility Iran developing a nuclear weapon and threatening the western world with it. The second risk was the deployment of new technologies in state cyber warfare. The third risk, often indirectly suggested, was the potential risk of a nuclear or other environmental catastrophe.

The use of CCTV cameras was the most salient topic in countries where the probability of terrorist attacks is perceived as low. The coverage was framed mainly in terms of actions and opinions of municipalities, journalists, schools, and citizens in relation to the use and installation of CCTV camera systems. The evaluation of the merits of CCTV cameras and acceptance of their introduction depended primarily on the domain that

was being monitored, and did not change much over time.

The second trend, found especially in Italy, is usually present in countries where the security threat is perceived as imminent and the media debate is dominated by politicians. In the second case, the urgent need for solutions is overemphasized in order to limit (or avoid) time for reflection. The motivations driving political actors' often emotional appeal to citizens' inherent fears, such as those of the *Lega Nord* party, is political saliency of the issues and possible electoral gain. Unlike in the first trend, where terrorism is something external, not immediately threatening citizens of the country, in the second trend the world is portrayed as full of global risks, to which only modern technology, presented as an efficient solution, can provide answer. In this oversimplified portrayal of reality, the facts are less important than emotional appeals, and renouncing privacy and intimacy for security is considered a necessity.

The coverage of Stuxnet in Mexico can be seen as falling into the second trend, as unlike any other country in the sample, the Mexican media clearly side with Iran, denounce the attackers (identified as the USA), and highlight Iran's right to sovereignty. In an interesting twist which can be explained by the complexity of the US-Mexican relations, Mexico sees itself as a possible target of similar attacks in the future.

Another good example is the coverage of the CCTV cameras in Poland, where we observe an emerging debate on the need for a comprehensive law which would regulate the use of public and private monitoring systems. However, the debate is not framed in terms of public transportation security, but rather in terms of the use of CCTV systems for the monitoring of public and private spaces for the sake of security, understood as crime prevention, detection and solution. Here, in some cases the acceptance of security measures, especially the lack of complexity, is linked by country studies to post-authoritarian path-dependent trends (Poland, Spain, and Italy). However, this trend is quite the opposite in Germany, where the past experience with a totalitarian regime heightens the sensitivity to trade-offs between security and privacy, human dignity and freedom.

In the qualitative comparative analysis, we have concentrated on the key role of media in political communication - both transmitting information and shaping opinions on key security issues (case studies include cyber terrorism as an example of risk and 3D scanners and CCTV cameras as an example of security measures, although it was mentioned above, that some media outlets framed Stuxnet as a security measure). The main factors shaping media reporting on terrorism threats and security measures are past experience with a particular security threat, as well as the probability of the country being targeted in the future. These factors account for the main differences in the extent of coverage dedicated to the issue in the domestic media.

In this deliverable, we hoped to amend a gap in the study of terrorism and security risk by concentrating on a comparison of the coverage of transnational issues in media outlets in ten countries. We find that the media landscape, although fragmented and largely confined by boundaries of nation-states, is undergoing a transformation as the

importance of the international context grows. The British and German media demonstrate the signs of this shift from a focus on security threats to an awareness of possible trade-offs between security measures and of health, privacy, and freedom. Terrorism and organised crime are increasingly framed as transactional and beyond the scope of nation-states to control. The public is becoming more sensitive not only to threats, but also to the costs of security.

The media plays a key role in shaping political communication and public attitudes. The media fulfils their informative and educational functions, and increasingly provides a platform for public political discourse, including the provision of space for the expression of dissent. The media is also a channel for the advocacy of political viewpoints (needed for the adoption and regulation of security measures) and to a significantly lesser degree acting as a ‘watchdog’ or guardian of freedoms. Hence it is important for the EU to be an active voice as well as an actor in the security debate beyond the boundaries of the nation-state. This can be ensued by following some of the recommendations presented in this report.

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Annex 1

Call for Applications

Prague Graduate School in Comparative Qualitative Analysis 2013

Prague, Czech Republic
13-18 May 2013

organised by the Institute of Sociology, Academy of Sciences of the Czech Republic and the project *SECONOMICS* “Socio-Economics meets Security”, funded within the 7th Framework Programme by the European Commission.

Summary:

The current social and life-style changes such as spatial mobility result in shifts in perceptions and acceptance of risks. In many instances there is a clear evidence for decreased sensitivity in this area that is closely related to a new public understanding of security. Aversion toward regulations, rules and their observance, lack of respect toward authorities and personal responsibility are only some of the studied research areas. Therefore, demographical, social and political differences behind particular attitudes of citizens in specific cases and in particular countries need to be identified.

In general, the public expects the government to render internal and external security. In return, citizens allow the government to act as the main guarantor of order. However, the citizen/consumer acceptance of the costs (visible/invisible immediate/extended effects) and the willingness to be exposed to risks is conditional and depends on the type of offered security, as well as the level of justification. An important aspect of this issue is the existence and functioning of communication channels and patterns between policy makers, stake holders and citizens in the area of security and risks. Identification of effective channels and patterns of communication and risk prevention for specific target groups is a fundamental topic that needs to be explored.

The Graduate School will concentrate on a comparative analysis of discourses and justification of security and risks presented in domestic and international media. It will provide an in-depth overview of the role and impact of the media on the perceptions and attitudes towards potential risks. The aim is to elaborate a set of recommendations and stimuli for the practitioners’ communication strategies between policy makers, stake holders and citizens in the area of risks and security.

About the Summer School:

The Prague Graduate School in Comparative Qualitative Analysis 2013 will deliver a professional training for advanced students and PhD students in selected qualitative methods employed within all fields of social sciences. The training will be delivered by experienced social scientists and researchers based at the Czech Academy of Sciences, University of Mainz, London School of Economics and the Charles University in Prague.

Early-career researchers and scholars will be trained to analyze the domestic and international media by the use of a common framework in order to be able to apply this

to a comparative analysis by elaborating national case studies. There will be a royalty per case study after delivery and quality control.

The course consists of six teaching days (one-week course), combining teaching and practical work, coding under supervision and individual one-on-one control.

Participant requirements:

1. Fluent knowledge of a language other than English;
2. English proficiency;
3. Willingness to learn working with software *Atlas.ti*;
4. In-depth knowledge of the national social background and media context;
5. Ability to work independently in an international academic environment.

Note: Four weeks prior to the graduate school, participants will receive keywords for article selection. Two weeks prior to the graduate school, participants will receive the coding scheme in English. They will be required to translate it into their respective language.

Eligibility:

Graduate students and young scholars;

Application procedure:

Please send your CV and together with your statement of interest, indicating why you would like to participate, what your current relevant experiences are and how you would like to benefit from the Graduate School.

Applications should be send to: Seconomics2013@soc.cas.cz

The deadline for applications is 1st March **2013**.

Costs:

Participants cover their own travel to and from Prague as well as their travel insurance, and a registration fee of € 250, which serves as a contribution to cover the organizational costs.

For all accepted participants, the organizers cover accommodation, local travel, subsistence and meal allowance (breakfast, lunch, dinner, coffee breaks), purchase of the Atlas.ti academic licenses, and purchase of the articles (if not available from public sources).

Fellowships:

A limited number of fee waivers and travel support grants is available. All participants can apply for a € 1500 fellowship, which is subject a timely delivery and successful quality control of a “country report”, build upon the activities done during the graduate school.

Venue:

Institute of Sociology, Academy of Sciences of the Czech Republic
 Jilská 1, 110 00 Prague 1, Czech Republic (www.soc.cas.cz)

Information:

More information about the *Prague Graduate School in Comparative Qualitative Analysis 2013* is available at SECONOMICS project website <http://www.seconomicsproject.eu/>

Annex 2 List of participants

Participants in the "Prague Graduate School in Comparative Qualitative Analysis 2013"

	<i>Name</i>	<i>M/F</i>	<i>Analysed country</i>
1	Beláková Nikola	F	Slovakia
2	Gawrecká Daniela	F	Czech Republic
3	Vamberová Pavla	F	Mexico
4	Fikret Aydogdu	M	Turkey
5	Puga Manuel Pereira	M	Spain
6	Sojka Aleksandra	F	Poland
7	Brimelow Julia Grace	F	USA
8	De Gramatica Martina	F	Italy
9	Caulfield Tristan	M	UK
10	Nitschke Ann-Katrin	F	Germany
11	Lacina Tomáš	M	blogs
12	Hronešová Jessie	F	supervision
	Guasti Petra	F	
	Mansfeldová Zdenka	F	
	Williams Julian	M	

Annex 3

Prague Graduate School in Comparative Qualitative Analysis 2013

Training workshop and three pre-tests including inter-coder reliability tests were organized. Training workshop in Prague held on 21.2., in order to train two participants, which were subsequently working on pre-tests (3D scanner pre-test) went very well, the codebook was working and inter-coder reliability test was fine also for the Stuxnet and CCTV cameras.

In total 8 articles were coded by three coders (three for the 3D body scanner, three for CCTV cameras and two for Stuxnet); during each pre-test coders made amendments to the coding scheme, upon approval of the pre-test coordinator, several new codes were introduced and in the subsequent step applied by coders; For the coding it was very important that coders were frequently communicating together, in the discussion number of questions was addressed regarding identifying sequences, distinguishing categories of codes as well as deconstructing language of the media; In-depth discussion of the coding sequences showed the vital role of incorporating coder's input. All questions were addressed, and subsequently, amended version of the master coding scheme was prepared.

Elaboration of three coding schemes (full version of coding schemes is Annex 4).

Identification of research period (1.1.2010-30.4.2013) and countries (Czech Republic, Germany, Italy, Mexico, Poland, Slovakia, Spain, Turkey, UK, US), and expert blogs was done in collaboration with project partners. The articles that are analysed in the study were selected from the period between January 2010 and April 2013.

Selecting of media in the ten countries under study (together with national experts) - two main dailies (based on circulation and political orientation), preparing sampling matrix, selecting articles (approximately 40 per country) and creating three samples for each country (representative to the media saliency over time).

Each article was sourced from the two most circulated quality dailies (i.e. mainstream newspapers, excluding yellow press) in the following countries: the old and the new EU member states the Czech Republic, Germany, Italy, Poland, Slovakia, Spain, the UK; as well as non-EU member states important in either shaping the global discussions on the selected issues (the USA) or key in providing relevant cultural diversity (Turkey and Mexico). Additionally, four expert security blogs were selected to supplement information on communication patterns for the general population with those among and towards the security expert community. The twenty national newspapers contributed over 2800 articles for the given period, the expert blogs contributed approximately 400 articles. The list of analysed media is in Annex 3, characteristic of analysed media is given in the national reports.

Annex 4. The Graduate School Evaluation Report


Call for application (the full text in Annex 1) was published in January 2013. Participants were selected based on their motivation letter, curriculum vitae, as well as expertise. Total number of eleven participants took part in the PGS covering ten countries (and stemming from eight countries), among which absolute majority were graduate students (exception were two advanced undergraduate students and one post-doctoral researcher), seven participants were female, four male; most were under 30 years of age.

A training workshop was held in Prague on 21.2. 2013 in order to train two participants, which were subsequently working on pre-tests. During the coding the pre-test coders made amendments to the coding scheme, upon approval of the pre-test coordinator, several new codes were introduced and in the subsequent step applied by coders. For the coding it was very important that coders were frequently communicating together, in the discussion number of questions was addressed regarding identifying sequences, distinguishing categories of codes as well as deconstructing language of the media. In-depth discussion of the coding sequences showed the vital role of incorporating coder's input. All questions were addressed, and subsequently, amended version of the master coding scheme was prepared. The pre-test shows that as coders get acquainted with the coding scheme and the topic, identification of sequences as well as coding becomes easier and inter-coder reliability increases significant.

The Prague Graduate School in Comparative Qualitative Analysis was held in the ISASCR on 13-18.5.2013 (programme in Annex 3). For the course it was important not only to teach the participants how to work with software for qualitative research and give them some theoretical background, but also to know their opinion on the whole event.

The first round surveying the expectations of individual participants was performed on the first day of the PGS. The results of this brief survey are best demonstrated in figure 1 below.

The first survey was anonymous and based on single open ended question, more answers were possible. Subsequently, the answers were clustered in five categories. As indicated above, most participants were motivated by desire to obtain methodological training. At this place it is important to say that three of the eleven participants were members of the Prague SECONOMICS team and hence, they were trained prior to PGS, hence in their case, more relevant motivation was collaboration on SECONOMICS project (second most often mentioned reason). The third category is also interesting as participants were also motivated in establishing collaboration networks for the future. The communication with the participants upon the conclusion of the PGS revealed that two participants are planning a joint research paper on security related issues using the knowledge gained. Last two categories are inspiration by high profile researchers and to see Prague. This is confirmation that both lecturers and location played role in participation.



Source: Comparative analysis of the SECONOMICS ISASCR media sample Prague

Figure 1: Participants' expectations

The second survey took place on the sixth and the last day of the PGS. Again anonymous, and open, this survey included three questions, first, weather the participants' expectations were met, what were then most positive features of the PG; and what could be improved for the future. To the first question, all participants answered positively. Most expectations have been met and in most cases also surpassed.

From the participants' own words, we see that the Prague SECONOMICS team has succeeded in providing encouraging learning space, content and training and all participants were satisfied.

Third participant survey was performed online six weeks upon the completion of the PGS, during the period when participants are individually working on their national reports. The resonance of this nine questions survey was lower (five participants answered the nine questions, some of which were opened, other offering several options based on answers in previous surveys).

The first question inquired about the way in which participants became aware of the SECONOMICS Prague Graduate School. This question is important for future use of this tool, as it allows for evaluation of the effectiveness of various recruitment methods. In case of the PGS, as the most effective method proofed the use of scientific networks as well as direct targeting of possible participants. Second question, again addressed the

reasons leading to application for the PGS. The answers confirmed the results presented in the figure 1. The next question revealed more about the background of individual participants (and confirmed information included in the letter of application - most participants took part in social science method training, qualitative or quantitative, prior to attending PGS. Next three questions (Q4, Q5 and Q6) inquired about the usefulness of the provided materials, instruction and practical training. All three were evaluated as very helpful (instruction was higher rated as materials, practical part was rated the best). At this time point the positive answer to question six is very important, as it attests that practical training equipped participants with skills necessary for the successful elaboration of national report.

The next two questions inquired about the effectiveness of the one-on-one sessions (each participant had at least two one-on-one session with the main instructor, this allowed for more free discussion of individual work and questions related to specific issue of the given domestic media sample). Individual training was also used as a way to overcome differences in participants' different methodological backgrounds. Question eight evaluated the overall satisfaction with the PGS stuff, which was very high as members of the Prague SECONOMICS team were seen predominantly as extremely helpful. The last questions were open and asked about overall learning outcomes and satisfaction. The results confirm the outcomes of the second survey.

To summarize and conclude, the opinion and words of the individual participants, the three surveys provided very satisfactory tool validation; most participants were very satisfied with the process and the outcomes. At this place it is important to note, that the participant support by the Prague SECONOMICS team did not conclude with the PGS, personal, online and group support is provided continuously, ensuring quality of the final product, i.e. national reports. However, the best attest of the success of the Prague Graduate School in Comparative Qualitative Analysis 2013 is that with one exception all reports were submitted, successfully passed quality review, and are step by step finalized for publication.

Annex 5. Coding schemes

Coding scheme 3D body scanner

1. Actors | 1.1. Institutions | 1.1.1. State institutions | 1.1.1.1. President | 1.1.1.2. national security agency| 1.1.1.3. Politicians | 1.1.1.4. Municipality |1.1.1.5. Transport Company | 1.1.1.6. City council | 1.1.1.7. Police | 1.1.1.8. Transport Security Agency | 1.1.2. Non-state institutions | 1.1.2.1. Private company | 1.1.2.1.1 Transportation Company | 1.1.2.2. Religious Organization|1.1.2.3. Advocacy Group/civil society |1.2. Individuals | 1.2.1. Journalist | 1.2.2. Terrorists | 1.2.3. Passengers |1.2.4. Experts| 1.2.5. Activists| 1.2.6.Others | 1.2.3.1. Scanners |1.2.3.2. Counterterrorism System |1.3. States
2. Topic | 2.1. Security General | 2.2. Security related rules and regulations | 2.3. Freedom | 2.4. Privacy | 2.5. Terrorism | 2.6. Government-led antiterrorism campaign | 2.6.1. Olympic games | 2.6.2. Stuxnet | 2.6.3. Flame | 2.7. Health issues | 2.8. Body Scanner | 2.8.1. Increase number of body scanners
3. Argumentative strategies | 3.1. definitive| 3.2. evaluative| 3.3. advocative |
4. Direction of argument | 4. 1. Positive| 4.2. negative |4.3. neutral |
5. Justification | 5.1. Security | 5.2. Efficiency | 5.2.1. Quality of service | 5.3. Freedom/Liberty | 5.4. Costs | 5.5. Health | 5.6. Privacy | 5.7. Dignity | 5.8. Business | 5.9. Legality
6. Interaction | 6.1. Cooperation | 6.2. Confrontation |
7. Actors' origin | 7.1. national | 7.1.1. USA | 7.1.2. UK | 7.1.3. Germany | 7.1.4. Italy | 7.1.5. Turkey | 7.1.6. Spain | 7.1.7. Poland | 7.1.8. Czech Republic | 7.1.9. Slovakia | 7.1.10. Mexico | 7.1.11. other | 7.2. international | 7.2.1. EU| 7.3. supranational | 7.4. actor is mentioned generally |
8. Political orientation of a paper | 8.1. Left-leaning |8.2. Right-leaning |
9. Country code | 9.1. USA | 9.2. UK | 9.3. Germany | 9.4. Italy | 9.5. Turkey | 9.6. Spain | 9.7. Poland | 9.8. Czech Republic | 9.9. Slovakia | 9.10. Mexico | 9.11. blogs |

Coding scheme Stuxnet

1. Actors | 1.1. Institutions | 1.1.1. State institutions |1.1.1.1. President |1.1.1.2. National Security Agency| 1.1.1.3. Israel secret service | 1.1.2. Non-state institutions | 1.1.2.1. Private company | 1.2. Individuals | 1.2. Individuals | 1.2.1. Journalist | 1.2.2. Terrorists | 1.2.3. Experts | 1.2.4. Activists| 1.2.5.Others| 1.3. Virus/Malware/Worm |

1.3.1. Stuxnet | 1.3.2. Flame | 1.4. Other | 1.4.1. State(s) | 1.4.2. media | 1.4.3. other groups |

2. Topic | 2.1. Security General | 2.2. Security related rules and regulations | 2.3. Freedom | 2.4. Privacy | 2.5. Terrorism | 2.6. Government-led antiterrorism campaign | 2.6.1. Olympic games | 2.6.2. Stuxnet | 2.6.3. Flame | 2.7. Cyber war | 2.8. Communication | 2.9. Attack | 2.9.1. Attack on Iran | 2.9.2. Attack on China | 2.9.3. Attack on other state | 2.9.4. Attack on a company | 2.10. Development of Stuxnet | 2.10.1. Development of Stuxnet by a state | 2.10.2. Deployment/attack using Stuxnet | 2.11. State accused of attack | 2.11.1. USA | 2.11.2 Israel | 2.12. Iranian uranium enrichment programme | 2.13. Counter-Attack | 2.14. Legality

3. Argumentative strategies | 3.1. definitive | 3.2. evaluative | 3.3. advocative |

4. Direction of argument | 4. 1. Positive | 4.2. negative | 4.3. neutral |

5. Justification | 5.1. Security | 5.1.1. Defense | 5.1.2. Premptive strike | 5.2. Efficiency | 5.3. Freedom/Liberty | 5.4. Costs | 5.5. Privacy | 5.6. Experimentation | 5.7. Expert opinion | 5.8. Legality |

6. Interaction | 6.1. Cooperation | 6.2. Confrontation |

7. Actors' origin | 7.1. national | 7.1.1. Iran | 7.1.2. Israel | 7.1.3. USA | 7.1.4. China | 7.1.5. North Korea | 7.1.6. South Korea | 7.1.7. Russia | 7.1.8. Palestina | 7.1.9. Syria | 7.1. 10. Indonesia | 7.1.11. United Kingdom | 7.1.12 other | 7.2. international | 7.3. supranational | 7.4. actor is mentioned generally |

8. Political orientation of a paper | 8.1. Left-leaning | 8.2. Right-leaning |

9. Country code | 9.1. USA | 9.2. UK | 9.3. Germany | 9.4. Italy | 9.5. Turkey | 9.6. Spain | 9.7. Poland | 9.8. Czech Republic | 9.9. Slovakia | 9.10. Mexico | 9.11. blogs |

Coding scheme CCTV Cameras Final

1. Actors | 1.1. Institutions | 1.1.1. State institutions | 1.1.1.1. President | 1.1.1.2. government security agency | 1.1.1.3. Politicians | 1.1.1.4. Municipality | 1.1.1.5. Transport Company | 1.1.1.6. City council | 1.1.1.7. Police | 1.1.2. Non-state institutions | 1.1.2.1. Private company | 1.1.2.1.1 Transportation Company | 1.1.2.2. Religious Organization | 1.1.2.3. Advocacy Group/Civil society | 1.2. Individuals | 1.2.1. Journalist | 1.2.2. Terrorists | 1.2.3. Citizen/Passenger | 1.2.4. Experts | 1.2.5. Activists | 1.2.6. Others | 1.2.3.1. CCTV Cameras | 1.2.3.2 Counterterrorism System |

2. Topic | 2.1. Security General | 2.1.1. National security | 2.1.2. Crime Prevention | 2.1.3. Crime detection | 2.1.4. Crime solution | 2.1.5. Public domain monitoring | 2.1.6. Private domain monitoring | 2.2. Security related rules and regulations | 2.3. Freedom |

2.3.1. Personal freedom | 2.3.2. Freedom of movement | 2.3.3. Surveillance Increase | 2.3.4. Surveillance Decrease | 2.3.5. Surveillance | 2.4. Privacy | 2.4.1. Personal data protection | 2.5. Terrorism | 2.6. Government-led antiterrorism campaign | 2.7. Indect Project | 2.8. Costs | 2.8.1. Funding | 2.9. Power | 2.9.1. centralization of power | | 2.10. Cameras CCTV | 2.10.1. Purchase/Installation of CCTV cameras | 2.11. Counter terrorist system | 2.12. Counter terrorism exercise | 2.13. Protest

3. Argumentative strategies | 3.1. definitive | 3.2. evaluative | 3.3. advocative |

4. Direction of argument | 4. 1. Positive | 4.2. negative | 4.3. neutral |

5. Justification | 5.1. Security | 5.1.1. National Security | 5.1.2. Crime Prevention | 5.1.3. Crime detection | 5.1.4. Crime solution | 5.1.4. Personal domain monitoring | 5.2. Efficiency | 5.2.1. Quality of service | 5.3. Freedom/Liberty | 5.4. Costs | 5.5. Transparency | 5.6. Right to Privacy | 5.7. Trust | 5.8. Safety |

6. Interaction | 6.1. Cooperation | 6.2. Confrontation |

7. Actors' origin | 7.1. national | 7.1.1. USA | 7.1.2. UK | 7.1.3. Germany | 7.1.4. Italy | 7.1.5. Turkey | 7.1.6. Spain | 7.1.7. Poland | 7.1.8. Czech Republic | 7.1.9. Slovakia | 7.1.10. Mexico | 7.1.11. other | 7.2. international | 7.2.1. EU | 7.3. supranational | 7.4. actor is mentioned generally |

8. Political orientation of a paper | 8.1. Left-leaning | 8.2. Right-leaning |

9. Country code | 9.1. USA | 9.2. UK | 9.3. Germany | 9.4. Italy | 9.5. Turkey | 9.6. Spain | 9.7. Poland | 9.8. Czech Republic | 9.9. Slovakia | 9.10. Mexico | 9.11. blogs |

Annex 6

European Regulatory Framework for 3D Body Scanners

According to Regulation EC 300/2008, the European Commission allows member States to adopt specific security measures designed to amend obsolete elements of common basic standards on aviation security. These measures include also “methods of screening, individually or in combination, as a primary or secondary means and under defined conditions”. Draft Regulation 300/2008 included 3D body scanners amongst potential allowed European airport screening technologies.

The European Parliament was not completely satisfied of this potential introduction of 3D body scanners, and with a Resolution on the 23rd October 2008, blocked the draft Regulation 300/2008.

The European Parliament requested a full ethical and legal impact assessment of 3D body scanner technologies on the basis that “the measures in question cannot be considered mere technical measures relating to aviation security, but have a serious impact on the fundamental rights of citizens”. Moreover, the European Parliament requested the competent authorities to carry out medical and economical assessments, in order to provide a clearer picture on the possible impact on health and a costs/benefits analysis.

Contemporarily the European Commission launched a Public Consultation, including a Questionnaire spread among citizens and the creation of a “Body Scanners Task Force”. The European Commission decided also to skip mentioning 3D body scanner in the final version of Regulation 300/2008, and to postpone any decision about it until its privacy and health impacts were fully assessed.

But just after the failed 2009 Christmas day attack on a flight from Amsterdam to Detroit, 3D body scanner systems became again a priority on the political agenda at an international level.

In the US, the Transportation Security Administration (TSA) ordered 300 more 3D body scanner machines to be added to the 40 scanners being currently used at 19 US airports. The Netherlands announced they would immediately begin using this technology for screening passengers of flights heading to the United States. Also UK and France declared to include 3D body scanner among airport security measures. The Italian government also decided to install 3d body scanner at three airports, in Rome, Milan and Venice. On Jan 14, 2010, in his hearing before the European Parliament’s Transport Committee, Commissioner Siim Kallas backed the idea of a single and integrated EU regulation on body scanners.

The European Parliament voted on July 2011 a resolution claiming that 3d body scanners should be allowed at EU airports only if “the health, dignity and privacy of passengers are protected”. The European Parliament accepted that body scanners would enhance aviation security, but ask Member States “to deploy technology which is the least

harmful for human health" and addresses privacy concerns. Due to health risks "scanners using ionising radiation should be prohibited in the EU".

Current Regulations were amended by the new Commission Regulation (EU) No 1141/2011 of 10 November 2011 amending Regulation (EC) No 272/2009, supplementing the common basic standards on civil aviation security as regards the use of security scanners at EU airports.

Main elements of this EU Regulation are:

- The use of security scanners at EU airports is optional for Member States and specific airports.
- But if EU Member States / airports decided to use them, some minimum operational conditions and performance requirements are applicable, in particular:
 - only security scanners which do not use ionizing radiation can be deployed and used for passenger screening;
 - security scanners shall not store, retain, copy, print or retrieve images;
 - any unauthorized access and use of the image is prohibited and shall be prevented;
 - the human reviewer analyzing the image shall be in separate location so that he/she cannot see the screened passenger
 - the image shall not be linked to the screened person and shall be blurred or obscured to prevent the identification of the face of the passenger;
 - any technical devices capable of storing, copying or photographing or otherwise recording images shall not be allowed in the separate location where the image is analyzed;
 - a passenger may request that the image of his/her body is analyzed by a human reviewer of the gender of his/her choice;
 - passengers must be given the possibility of opting out from a security scanner, the passenger shall be screened by an alternative screening method including at least a hand search;
 - passengers must be fully informed on the security technology used, its characteristics and open issues, before being scanned.

But after more than a year the situation seemed to be neither clear nor satisfactory. In fact, the European Parliament, in its report on the situation of fundamental rights in the European Union adopted on 12 December 2012, called on 'the Commission and the Member States to abrogate or review the rules on liquids and body scanners' and urged the Commission 'to bring infringement proceedings against those Member States violating EU regulations protecting citizens' fundamental rights on the matter'.

It seems that 3D body scanner adoption is still debated and their implementation in many countries was suspended.

Annex 7

Comparative report - media

Gawrecká, D., J. Hronešová, P. Vamberová, P. Guasti, Z. Mansfeldová. 2014.

Available from: <http://www.soc.cas.cz/en/project/seconomics-socio-economics-meets-security>

Later from: <http://www.seconomicsproject.eu>

The three topics that we included in the analysis didn't attract the same level of attention among the studied countries. The United States acted as a leading country in the case of 3D body scanners and Stuxnet, providing the discourse for the rest of the countries that we have analyzed. On the other hand, in the third analyzed topic it played only a marginal role. CCTV cameras caused major attention and controversy in Poland and Germany. Poland belongs among the strongest supporters of the installations of CCTV cameras while German articles revealed it standing on the opposite side and arguing mainly negatively towards these devices.

The United States are indisputably the leading country in the debate about 3D body scanners according to the number of different actors providing the statements in the press. The discussion there was opened after the failed terrorist attack in the Detroit-Amsterdam plane in 2009. The most influential actor providing statements in the US is Transport Security Agency arguing for implementation of body scanners. A lot of space in the media is given to "experts" who were mainly speaking about the health risks of the scanners and evaluating them negatively. The rest of the countries are rather reactive on the events happening in the US. In Great Britain and Spain there is a strong voice of journalists themselves in the statements. Italy makes an exception among other countries with the strongest position of "politicians" in the debate in media. Slovakia, Poland, Czech Republic, Spain or Mexico did not pay much attention to this issue according to the number and quality of articles published. They mostly just adopted the US or other foreign articles and informed about the case at hand.

Stuxnet represents a special case among our three topics. It is not directly connected with the public but at the same time it can have unprecedented consequences in their lives. The topic in media was opened in 2010 by the cyber-attack on the Iranian power plant. At the beginning it was framed almost entirely in a definitive way. The leading actors of the statements were "experts" and various state officials from Iran and the United States. As time passed, the debate moved from specific happenings to a more abstract level discussing potential cyber war and involving a wider variety of actors of not strictly expert character. The evaluative strategies used in the articles about Stuxnet were mostly negative but we can say that generally the countries apart from the US played the role of a detached observer rather than giving any significant opinion about the case. The only exception was Mexico where some articles included a fear of being similarly targeted in the future, identifying itself rather with the victims than with the perpetrators of the attack.

The last topic, CCTV cameras caused major attention among the studied countries and the roles of the leaders in the debate changed completely in comparison to the other

two topics. USA unlike in the other two cases did not play any important role. CCTV cameras apparently do not cause mayor controversies there. They attracted more attention only after the attack in Boston Marathon in April 2013 when they helped to reveal the culprits. The leaders of the debate about CCTV cameras among our selected countries were Poland and Germany expressing completely opposite insight. While Poland evaluates the use of CCTV cameras use positively viewing it as part of the country's modernization, in Germany negative evaluations regarding the right to privacy prevail.

Analysis showed that media and public are aware of the trade-offs between security, privacy and the need of regulation of the security measures. On the other hand, the aspects of internal and external security are not neglected because terrorisms and organized crime are perceived as relevant security threats. In other words, consensus on a certain degree of surveillance is necessary. Despite of this fact, newspapers reflected that greater security does not necessarily require a loss of privacy and vice versa. In this respect, newspapers fulfilled their function to be a platform for critical discussion.

Annex 8

Report on Expert Blogs Analysis

Lacina, Tomáš. 2014. Report on Expert Blogs Analysis.

<http://www.soc.cas.cz/en/project/seconomics-socio-economics-meets-security>

Later from: <http://www.seconomicsproject.eu>

The specific area of expert blogs might differ a lot from the scope and nature of traditional printed media. The significant differences among blogs in terms of scope, ownership/operator and type of articles/posts provided, brings serious limitations to comparability and bias of such analysis. However, it may serve as a valuable insight in coverage and manner of coverage of our three security topics among a highly specialized community. The analysis showed, that despite the blogs should be expert based, the quality of articles varies a lot, maybe with the exception of The Register blog, which proved to be a very sophisticated source of information and in depth-discussion among the interested readers community. On the other hand, the HITB blog is rather an announcement blog - it concentrates short and adopted news from the security industry, with focus on cyber security, but does provide very little valuable analysis. The Bemosa and Roger-Wilco blogs as very narrow-topic blogs, provided high quality articles, but given the fact of such a high specialization, they offered also a limited scope of information valuable for the objectives of our study.

There were major differences concerning the level of particular topics coverage among the blogs analyzed. Generally, the issue of Stuxnet was very dominant, with almost 70% of articles referring to the topic. CCTV cameras represent the topic of nearly 20% of articles and about 11% of articles dealt with 3D body scanners.

As far as the expert blog analysis is concerned, the topic of Stuxnet was by far the most salient one and was also significantly different from the two other topics. Apparently, the topic of cybersecurity and hacking attracted the attention of this particular blog community, since this area appears to be its main field of interest. Given the global nature of the Stuxnet worm, the variety of actors identified was much higher, encompassing international Experts, State institutions and Media as the most frequent ones.

In cases of CCTV cameras and 3D body scanners, state institutions and civil society advocacy groups were entering the debate the most. In the case of CCTV cameras, also police would be included, being regarded as a law-enforcing state institution. As for the 3D body scanners, institutions were by far the most frequent actor, prevailingly meaning EU institutions - the European Parliament, European Commission, European committees etc. The CCTV cameras debate, on the other hand, involved mostly national institutions, prevailingly British.

Annex 9 National reports

9.1. Italy

Martina de Gramatica, 2013. “Better Naked than Dead” COMMUNICATING SECURITY ANALYSIS OF ITALIAN PERCEPTION OF SECURITY RELATED ISSUES. Prague SECONOMICS Discussion Papers 2013/1 [online].

<http://www.seconomicsproject.eu/content/better-naked-dead-communicating-analysis-italian-perception-security-related-issues>

The report outlines a well-defined national scenario where media plays a relevant role in shaping perceptions of security, raising the level of risk according to a specific political framework based on a generic fear of the Other. A high perception of risk leads to a high acceptance of security measures, firmly thought to be technological solutions. Renouncing privacy and intimacy in favor of security is a clear contradiction that paves the way for further violations that may not yet be clear. The legality and ethical implications of security measures should be taken in consideration by decision makers and stated as *conditio sine qua non* security measures are applied. These instruments are not only technical instruments, but socio-technical tools as well, as they have social consequences which we should always consider. More complex solutions should be researched in order to both defend privacy *and* pursue security.

The national debate around security issues in 2010-2013 was mainly driven by proponents of the *Lega Nord* party, a right-wing political faction in office during the period considered. The articles give no voice to representatives from the left side of the Italian Parliament. The extremely weak and almost non-existent reaction of the left to the violent narrative of the *Lega Nord* allowed for the creation and the strengthening of a narrative centered on the issues of security and immigration as it concerned crime.

Given the supremacy of the *Lega Nord* in the debate, themes related to security have echoed through the media in the period under study. The political party in charge has great power over the broadcast media. This situation is particularly true in the Italian case where the two major TV networks are closely controlled by the right-wing parties. The articles' content reveals the tendency of Italian media to be politicians' watchdogs, supporting their ideas and spreading their world view. As shown in the debate over the 3D body scanners and CCTV cameras, even if opponents of the implementation of the devices are present in the debate, the voices of actors that support the measures come to dominate. Opponents come to play a sort of secondary role and counter-weight to politicians prevailing voices.

The general opinion about the implementation of security measures considered is positive. These security measures are perceived as optimal solutions in terms of efficacy and costs, while health and privacy problems are easily solved. Risk is mainly perceived in urban contexts and public places. Furthermore, it is attributed to terrorism and criminal actions. Citizens' risk assessments are largely affected by the political discourses and by the frequency with which these discourses are cited. Security related themes dominate in the debate and privacy is perceived as a price to pay to improve security.

9.2. Slovakia

Nikola Belakova, 2013. Surveillance Cameras Everywhere You Look? The portrayal of the Security vs. Privacy Dilemma in the Slovak Press, 2010 - 2013. Prague SECONOMICS Discussion Papers 2013/2 [online].

<http://www.seconomicsproject.eu/content/surveillance-cameras-everywhere-you-look-portrayal-security-vs-privacy-dilemma-slovak-press>

How the media portray different security risks is dependent on several factors. Past experience with a particular security threat seems to be the key aspect in accounting for the extent of coverage dedicated to an issue in the media. On the one hand, the fact that Slovakia has never experienced a terrorist attack or an extensive cyber-attack can explain the relatively minute coverage of the issue of 3D body scanners and Stuxnet. On the other hand, the direct experience of journalists and citizens with property crime explains the extensive coverage of the use of CCTV cameras. Our research also indicates that how the media frames the implications of the use of new technologies in response to different security risks is the function of the nature of the technologies themselves. Namely, technologies that intrude into the private or intimate spheres of individuals' lives receive more negative coverage, even if the particular security risk is perceived as high. In those cases, alternative, less intrusive technological measures are deemed preferable by the media and by implication by the public. As could be expected, security technologies themselves may come to be seen as producing further risks and to be evaluated negatively in the media and by the public if their use has possible adverse consequences for citizens' health.

Based on the above, we conclude with several tentative hypotheses of how the press's reporting on the three selected issues could influence the risk perceptions of Slovak citizens. Given the little coverage and the lack of direct experience with a terrorist attack on Slovak territory, we could expect the Slovak public to be the least concerned about security threats related to airports. Instead, the public would be concerned with protecting their private and intimate spheres and thus would not be prepared to accept the use of 3D body scanners.

In view of the marginally higher number of articles and Slovakia's experience with cyber-attacks on governmental websites, we could expect the public to be slightly more concerned about the risks related to the Stuxnet phenomenon. We could not only assume that citizens sense the danger of Iran's development of nuclear weapons, but also that they may be apprehensive about the risk of environmental catastrophes in connection with the deployment of high-tech technologies like Stuxnet that target the energy infrastructures in other states. However, we would not expect the Slovak public to be particularly anxious about the possibility of a cyber-attack on Slovakia's power grid.

Taking into account the extensive coverage of CCTV camera systems in the Slovak press, we would suggest that the public's perception of the everyday challenges to their safety in terms of theft, burglary, public disorder, or vandalism could be expected to rise. The extensive reporting on CCTV cameras and the omnipresent crime could be expected to



result in an increased perception of an imminent threat, despite the fact that actual crime rates have been steadily falling over the years. As a result of the positive coverage of CCTV camera systems in the papers, we could expect the public to accept the use of CCTV cameras in public transport and other public spaces without much consideration given to the issue of their privacy. Citizens could also be expected to be more concerned with their privacy in places they consider as part of the private sphere.

9.3. Poland

Aleksandra Sojka, 2013. Poland - a Surveillance Eldorado? Security, Privacy, and New Technologies in Polish Leading Newspapers (2010-2013). Prague SECONOMICS Discussion Papers 2013/3. [online].

<http://www.seconomicsproject.eu/content/poland-%E2%80%93-surveillance-eldorado-security-privacy-and-new-technologies-polish-leading>

The findings of the analysis offer an interesting picture of how risk is perceived in Polish society and what kind of trade-offs between privacy and security people deem acceptable. Despite the fact that Poles are increasingly convinced of the possibility of a terrorist attack in the country, the debates concerning the 3D body scanners and the Stuxnet virus are framed as external to the Polish context, dominated by foreign actors. The articles remain mostly descriptive in terms of argumentative strategies and Polish media coverage of these issues followed events and debates only in the international context. The discussion of 3D body scanners received a very limited coverage in the Polish press, and was focused mostly on the issue of privacy. The Stuxnet virus attracted more attention from the Polish media, but mostly in terms of cyber war and cyber espionage. No mention of Polish critical infrastructure appeared in the media analyzed.

Unequivocally, the topic of CCTV cameras was the issue which received most coverage in the Polish media under analysis. The debate was almost entirely focused on the domestic context and dominated by national actors. Moreover, it contained the highest number of evaluative and advocative statements, suggesting the strongest debate on the issue, as compared to the other two topics. Furthermore, the issue of CCTV cameras is the only one where we find a significant difference in treatment of the topic between the two newspapers analyzed. As far as the topics raised are concerned, the most important point seems to be that we are witnessing an emerging debate on the need for a comprehensive law which would regulate the use of public and private monitoring systems in Poland. Therefore, we can expect that the salience of the topic will continue to rise, especially after the recent declarations by Prime Minister Tusk regarding government plans to propose a comprehensive law on the issue.

Another interesting aspect of the Polish case is the absence of transport companies in the debate, or any references to the use of CCTV in public transport. Also, there is very little mention of CCTV cameras in reference to terrorism or national security. The Polish debate regarding security and privacy stems from the need to regulate the use of CCTV systems for public and private domain monitoring. However, we find no specific mention or link of these issues to the communist state surveillance practices. Rather, in view of the media content analyzed, we can argue that the fact that surveillance techniques, such as the CCTV cameras, are largely unquestioned and met with approval of the Polish society, remains closely linked to the ramifications of post-socialist transformations. The social perception of these modern surveillance techniques as part of “modernity” is embedded in the discourse of “catching up with the West,” that is, adopting Western social practices and values. The resulting situation is that where a society busy with modernization in order to overcome its non-democratic past, failed to note that



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contemporary Poland seems to have become “surveillance Eldorado” where state and non-state actors’ surveillance of the citizens has little legal limits.



9.4. Mexico

Pavla Vamberová, 2013. "I'll Be Watching You" COMMUNICATING SECURITY AND PRIVACY ISSUES IN THE MEXICAN PRESS. Prague SECONOMICS Discussion Papers 2013/4. [online]. http://www.soc.cas.cz/sites/default/files/soubory/mexico_ill_be_watching_you.pdf

Mexico is a large country with 31 states, each with its own issues. As a result it is not easy to make generalizations when we refer to it. However, these three topics all have a national impact and can be interpreted at the national level. In Mexico there is official freedom of the press, but reality is not as bright as it might initially seem. Many interests, from business to politics to organized crime, put pressure on media outlets in an effort to influence their coverage. According to Reporters Without Borders, Mexico is in fact one of the most dangerous countries in the world for journalists.

The media in Mexico confronts its consumers daily with pictures and stories of the escalating violence of organized crime in the country. These narratives build public perceptions of the state of security in the country, and the need to improve it. Yet the portrayal of the security measures studied in this report are not entirely positive. Rather, CCTV cameras and 3D body scanners receive some critical evaluation, which one might not expect from a society in such a position. For instance, the articles highlighted many shortcomings of CCTV cameras. The main arguments against the cameras were that they violated people's privacy. But despite this perhaps surprising critical eye, the majority of the arguments were positive and were strongly connected with fear and insecurity. It seems that crime prevention is ultimately a bulletproof argument for CCTV cameras in Mexico.

While CCTV was seen within the context of security within Mexico, 3D body scanners were seen more independently of the country's security situation. The articles mostly dealt with the presence of 3D body scanners in US airports. The discussion then focused more on Mexicans as people forced to pass through stricter controls in the airports, rather than on the systems' security benefits. The opinions about 3D body scanners can be easily divided by actors. Transport companies, transport security agencies, and state institutions used the need for security as an argument for 3D body scanners. Passengers and civil society representatives, on the other hand, used dignity and the right to privacy as an argument against the 3D body scanners.

The third topic, Stuxnet, on the other hand, did receive extensive coverage. On this topic Mexico stands more on the side of Iran and its right to sovereignty, and opposes this act of a hidden war from another state. It sees the USA as guilty of foul play. Also, Mexico considers itself a possible target of similar attacks in the future. The only strategy mentioned to counter these attacks was having as good antivirus protection as possible.

Generally, we can say that there was a debate about all three topics in the selected years and that CCTV cameras in public spaces was the most pertinent topic for Mexicans. Consequently, public opinion on this topic would be a worthy subject of further research.

9.5. Czech Republic

Daniela Gawrecká, 2013. Country Report Czech Republic. Contribution to the SECONOMICS project and Prague Graduate School in Comparative Qualitative Analysis 2013. Prague SECONOMICS Discussion Papers 2013/5. [online].

<http://www.seconomicsproject.eu/content/who-watches-watchmen-risk-perception-and-security-vs-privacy-dilemma-czech-press>

Given the agenda-setting role of the media and the still large readerships of Czech dailies, we used two large-circulation Czech dailies as important sources of information about Stuxnet, CCTV cameras and 3D body scanners. The main research findings of this report indicate that CCTV cameras were the most prominent issue in both papers than Stuxnet and 3D body scanners. The right-leaning MF DNES was particularly interested in this issue. Nevertheless, the quality of the articles dealing with CCTV cameras was lower than that of the articles on Stuxnet and body scanners. The articles were shorter, relatively informative, but for the most part did not contain expert opinions or a deeper analysis of the issue. In contrast, Stuxnet was the least interesting issue for the coded newspapers. Although both papers considered this computer virus to be a threat they paid it the least attention from our selected security topics.

In the articles about Stuxnet and 3D body scanners, the journalists used international sources of information, for example, press agencies and foreign media. The reason for this could be that these issues were more complex and technically detailed than CCTV cameras. The reason why Czech dailies paid the most attention to CCTV cameras could be that this is the only topic of direct relevance to the Czech Republic; cameras have already been installed in many Czech cities. The other two topics may seem slightly remote for Czech newspaper readers.

On the other hand, the cyber-espionage scandal exposed by Edward Snowden shows that one can never be entirely sure about cyber-security. The dominant narrative strategy used in the articles on all three issues was definitive and the tone of the evaluations was neutral. Despite this, we found striking differences between the evaluations. However, the differences in evaluations occurred between topics not between papers. CCTV cameras received overwhelmingly positive evaluations in both papers, whereas negative evaluations prevailed in the case of 3D body scanners. There were almost no evaluations of Stuxnet in either of the papers. In contrast to CCTV cameras and body scanners, the media coverage (the number of articles and evaluations) of Stuxnet was very similar in the right- and left-leaning papers. CCTV cameras were in both newspapers considered to be a very useful tool for preventing, detecting and solving crime. Nevertheless, Právo was slightly more critical of CCTV than MF DNES. The left-leaning paper pointed more to the negative aspects of surveillance.

On the topic of 3D body scanners, both papers often criticised the negative impact on health. While on the topic of CCTV cameras, the media in the analysis considered the loss of privacy was considered a reasonable sacrifice for security. In contrast, the newspapers considered the increased risk health problems posed by body scanners to be too high a price to feel safe.

9.6. Spain

Manuel Pereira-Puga and Jessie Hronesova, 2013. Risks and Security in Spanish Newspapers: The Cases of 3D Body Scanners, CCTV and Stuxnet. Prague SECONOMICS Discussion Papers 2013/6. [online].

<http://www.seconomicsproject.eu/content/risks-and-security-spanish-newspapers-cases-3d-body-scanners-cctv-and-stuxnet>

This report is a national case study on the media coverage of security issues of two leading Spanish papers the national centre-left *El País* and the regional centre-right *La Vanguardia*. The results of our analysis point to two main trends. First, economic issues prevail over security due to the on-going financial crisis and economic malaise in Spain. Second, privacy has remained a very important concern for Spanish citizens. The analysis of 3D body scanners shows that media present this case as quite controversial. Passengers are afraid of exposing their bodies, as they see the scanners as a violation of their privacy. Politicians and policy-makers are clearly aware of the importance of passing a law that would respect civil rights and chase away such concerns. Even when a body scanner is a technology designed to fight against one of the major global risks - international terrorism - actors involved in its implementation and use realize that it is a potentially invasive technology. Its application thus needs to be very careful in order to balance the trade-offs between privacy and security.

On the other hand, the case of CCTV cameras is surprisingly less controversial. Articles on this topic primarily focus on the installation of new devices, particularly in Barcelona and other Catalan cities and towns. In fact, citizens and passengers are mostly quoted giving their support or even calling for more cameras. This is not totally consistent with some empirical research on the acceptance of new security technologies in Spain, as these studies show resistance to public surveillance. This points either to a certain level of self-censorship, given the financial connections between the state and these two newspapers, or maybe some other private interests on the side of the media.

The third topic, Stuxnet, is quite different from the other two. Both 3D body scanners and CCTV systems are security technologies that affect citizens' daily lives. However, the newspapers frame Stuxnet as a weapon used in a cyber-war against governments. That is why people's opinion does not play a leading role in this topic. In fact, cyber war is even legitimized by some experts as a way to maintain security without causing any deaths. It is a peaceful compromise to cause economic harm while maintaining peace. This report has also shown that the analyzed Spanish media lack a substantial analytical dimension regarding security issues. The predominant strategy of reporting was a definitive narrative, as only a few actors, who are cited directly, evaluate or give recommendations.

9.7. USA

Nikola Belakova, 2013. Drawing the line between security and privacy. An analysis of security discourses in the US press, 2010-2013. Prague SECONOMICS Discussion Papers 2013/7. [online].

http://seconomicsproject.eu/sites/default/files/content-files/downloads/drawing_the_line_between_security_and_privacy.pdf

The analysis revealed that the coverage was considerably influenced by various domestic and national developments. While we did not observe any clear-cut differences in the portrayal of the issues between topics or between newspapers, we uncovered some subtler, but no less interesting, trends in terms of the volume of coverage dedicated to topics and discourses employed by the newspapers.

The 3D body scanner controversy resonated with the US press the most of the three topics analysed in this report. Following the failed airplane attack in late 2009, the US authorities were intensely reconsidering airport security measures. The new air travel regulations included the screening by 'backscatter' full-body scanners, which could see through passengers' clothes, in an attempt to expose explosives. The machines became the subject of a controversy due to fears of possible health risks, as well as privacy and even efficiency concerns. The newspapers explained the rules governing the use of scanners and presented the views of the various parties to the controversy. The issue of body scanners was framed as a domestic news item and in a negative light. The message implied by the articles was that the security risks related to a potential terrorist threat in air travel do not justify the intrusion of passengers' privacy, the unpleasant experience of the screening, and/or a potential risk of developing cancer. At times, the coverage also questioned the ability of the scanners to detect a novel terrorist threat and proposed alternative security measures instead.

The US media showed the second largest interest in the Stuxnet topic. This is understandable as the virus did not target private computers and thus did not directly affect ordinary Americans. Based on the coverage, the public might have perceived Iran's uranium enrichment as a real threat, and would thus have positively evaluated USA's cyber strategy. On the other hand, due to the potential risks linked to the virus's proliferation and counter-attacks triggered by its deployment, the coverage was rather negative towards the use of Stuxnet. Based on the discussions in US newspapers, we would expect the public to become apprehensive of the government's use of new, advanced technologies to combat the threat of Iran's nuclear programme or other possible targets, especially in an unregulated environment.

The use of CCTV camera systems in public transport and in general was a virtual non-issue for the US newspapers. Public discussions about the benefits of surveillance only really started after the tragic Boston Marathon bombing of April 2013, when CCTV footage proved crucial in tracking down the suspects. From the coverage, it would seem that the public was either oblivious or in favour of using surveillance cameras because they viewed cameras as vital in the efforts to solve crimes and increase security. On the other hand, the newspapers also presented views critical of the lawmakers' intentions to use more invasive surveillance systems and measures.

9.8. Germany

Ann-Katrin Nitschke, 2013. Country Report Germany. Research report. Available from <http://www.seconomicsproject.eu/downloads>.

In general we can say that Germany is very critical to all of the three topics. The left-leaning newspaper SZ was for example not in favor with the CCTV surveillance because of the right to privacy. Based on the liberal and social principles of the SZ it holds people's prosperity near and dear. On the other hand we have the right-leaning newspaper FAZ. They are also critical and not in favor of the CCTV surveillance. But their reasons are different. They are interested in issues like the efficiency and the cost of CCTV systems. Why should we spent a lot of money for something that doesn't work? But they are also interested in the people's rights. That point was still a main topic for the FAZ. At the beginning of the debate in 2010 the topics "public domain monitoring" and "surveillance increase" were important.

In the case of Stuxnet the differences between the two newspapers were very small. Both of them were mainly interested at the attack of Iran. The FAZ also had a focus on the topic cyber war. Maybe that is because of the weak point. The nuclear plant in Iran was a very dangerous aim to attack. That has shown what a worm is able to do. Also important was the Development of Stuxnet and Stuxnet itself. After a while the Iran and its nuclear plant became interesting in the media. Because now the people could see that Iran has got nuclear power and that they are researching at this topic. Maybe the fear about that and about the consequences which could happen if a war starts was one of the reasons to have a focus on this. In both newspapers the main justification was the expert opinion. The articles have reported many statements from experts.

At the topic body scanners the main actors at the FAZ were the politicians, while the scanners themselves are the main actors in the case of the SZ. This can be explained with the reason that the FAZ lean onto statements of politicians. The SZ is more explaining what the scanners do. This is why the scanners here are the main actors. But also they have a focus on the experts and their opinions. In the articles of SZ there are many statements from Experts for example some studies which were performed from universities in different countries. They have tested the Health issues and the efficiency of the devices. The SZ has reported a lot of these studies to give the readers an overview.

Germany has concerns about data security and privacy, also relating to espionage and cyber war. Especially Stuxnet fortifies these fears. For each analyzed topic these arguments are relevant. In these days Snowden causes a stir. He published frightening information. For some critics in Germany the grave concerns became true. All data collected by any system is not trustful, also regarding CCTV cameras and body scanners. The politics behave excessively calm to not damage the friendship with the United States. But some newspapers remember Echolon, which was used for economic espionage. Many people stick with Snowden, although the politics do not official support his methods.

9.9. U.K.

Jessie Hronesova, Tristan Caulfield and Petra Guasti, 2013. *The Xanadu of surveillance: Report on security perceptions in the British online media*. Available from: <http://www.soc.cas.cz/en/project/seconomics-socio-economics-meets-security>, later from: <http://www.seconomicsproject.eu/downloads>.

To summarize, the three security debates in the British press show interesting similarities and differences. The most important difference is the object of security. In the case of CCTV cameras and body scanner debates the individual is at the heart of the debate. Individual in a modern world, to whom various security measures provide security from terrorist threat with a trade-off in bridging on privacy and civic rights. In the Stuxnet debate, the object of security, to which cyber warfare provides security from potential cyber terrorism, is the state (national security, security of critical infrastructures).

In the British debate, we see a strong presence regarding the trade-off between privacy and security. This debate is closely related to civil rights groups objecting to an unregulated introduction of the body scanner, referring to privacy but also raising issues such as human dignity, respect for religious freedom and diversity in opposition of to the governments' attempts to increase security at the cost of privacy. This clearly demonstrates that new technology and security measure can also raise new issues and that acceptance of such measure is conditioned culturally, but also by belief that new measure will be used in a regulated way.

To a lesser degree this trade-off is also present in the CCTV surveillance debate. Increasingly, the use of CCTV cameras under general security label is questioned and clear delineation between crime prevention and anti-terrorism is required. This distinction is important and rather clear, the public acceptance of the use of CCTV cameras in crime prevention was used as a smoke screen for anti-terrorism. The civil rights organisations try to moderate the ways in which the vast use of CCTV cameras in combination with increasing technological possibilities impinge on privacy and civil liberties. And so in the body scanner debate the national government that is pressing for the new technology, and in the CCTV surveillance debates the police and local councils that are implementing the potentially privacy-reducing measures, face increasing opposition.

The Stuxnet debate with its absence of discussion also raises important questions, yet on another level of abstraction - shifting from domestic to an international arena, from the relationship between the state and the citizen and its regulation by law to the relationships among states and its regulation by international law, from the conventional to cyber warfare. The Stuxnet debate also shows another potential danger - the higher the degree of technical complexity of an issue the lesser debate. However, as we demonstrate here, complex issues relate to key issues which, while not concerning citizen directly, have far reaching implications to critical national infrastructures and the ways in which modern states interact with each other in the vacuum of international law and behind the smoke screen of anti-terrorism.